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ABSTRACT
Antitrust law accepts the competitive marketplace, its operation,
and its outcomes as an ideal. Society itself need not and does not.
Although antitrust is not in the business of evaluating, for example,
the “fairness” of prices, society can, and frequently does, properly
concern itself with these issues. When dissatisfaction results, it may
manifest itself in an expressive boycott: a form of social campaign
wherein purchasers express their dissatisfaction by collectively
refusing to buy. Antitrust should neither participate in nor censor
such normative discourse. In this Article, I explain how antitrust law
impedes this speech, argue why it should not, and provide a
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framework that accommodates both First Amendment and antitrust
values.
The expressive boycotts this Article addresses are characterized by
speech that is political yet also economically self-interested. The
boycotts discussed involve scientists protesting research tool
purveyors, doctors protesting pharmaceutical companies, and
academics and librarians protesting for-profit publishers. The legal
regimes that govern such undertakings, First Amendment and
antitrust law, have proven inept in addressing this phenomenon,
which lies at their intersection. I attribute their shortcomings to a
combination of the First Amendment’s excessive reliance upon
categorization and antitrust’s unduly narrow reliance on economic
efficiency. I then craft a recommendation for handling these
expressive boycotts that will help ensure that speech about the market
can be as free as the market itself.
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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law accepts the competitive marketplace, its operation,
and its outcomes as the ideal. Society itself need not and does not. So,
although antitrust is not in the business of evaluating the “fairness” of
prices, for example, society can, and frequently does, properly
concern itself with these issues. When dissatisfaction results, it may
manifest itself in an expressive boycott, which is a form of social
campaign wherein purchasers express their dissatisfaction by
collectively refusing to buy. Antitrust should neither participate in
nor censor such normative discourse. In this Article, I explain how
antitrust law may impede this speech, argue why it should not, and
provide a framework that accommodates both First Amendment and
antitrust values. I examine this value conflict with particular emphasis
on situations that involve intellectual property.
The expressive boycotts that this Article addresses are
characterized by speech that is political yet also economically selfinterested. What law governs such undertakings? Unfortunately, both
the First Amendment and antitrust legal regimes have proven inept at
addressing the phenomenon of expressive boycotts, which lies at their
intersection. This shortcoming reflects, in the first instance, the
difficulty of placing those expressive boycotts into the existing legal
categories of speech. Prevailing law, for better or worse, relies heavily
on categorization to determine the degree of First Amendment
protection afforded to particular speech. Sometimes, however, the
law may mischaracterize speech, forcing it into a box that does not
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quite fit. Without sufficient First Amendment protection, expressive
speech is rendered unduly vulnerable to the application of the
antitrust laws. Antitrust law, with its primary emphasis on economic
efficiency, accords no value to the speech at issue—in much the same
manner that it largely disregards any noneconomic consideration.
Perhaps nothing more poignantly illustrates the peculiar
jurisprudential straits in which society finds itself than revisiting a
celebrated series of boycotts in American history armed with
contemporary case law. The colonial boycotts of British merchants
are often held out as examples of the noble and powerful role of
boycotts. John Hancock, for example, played a key role in organizing
1
those boycotts. Ironically, however, Hancock’s celebrated rabblerousing conduct might have been chilled under modern antitrust law.
Hancock was a wealthy merchant whose business was decimated by
2
the import taxes imposed by the British government as well as the
lack of taxes imposed on the East India Company, which could then
3
easily undersell merchants such as Hancock. Whatever his more
noble aspirations, Hancock had a profound economic interest in the
4
boycotts. Under current antitrust law, he and other merchant
boycotters might have been condemned. Hancock’s organization and
participation in the boycott would not constitute political speech
owing to the presence of economic self-interest on his part and,
therefore, would not warrant First Amendment protection. Colonial
history aside, one need look no further than to contemporary events
to discover numerous instances of collective action that are legally
dubious from an antitrust perspective yet brimming with expressive
value.
In 1990, a New York Times article declared boycotts to be “[a]
5
[g]rowth [i]ndustry.” Ten years later, the newspaper observed that

1. See HARLOW GILES UNGER, JOHN HANCOCK: MERCHANT KING AND AMERICAN
PATRIOT 97–100, 106–07, 112–13, 131–32 (2000) (analyzing the roles of both politics and
economic self-interest in Hancock’s boycott activities).
2. Id. at 83.
3. Id. at 164.
4. Id. at 99; see also CLAUDE H. VAN TYNE, THE CAUSES OF THE WAR OF
INDEPENDENCE 377 (1922) (“Since the public would actually profit as far as the cost of its tea
was concerned, the injured merchants were careful not to confine their agitation too closely to
the true issue of their own prospective losses.”).
5. Anthony Ramirez, From Coffee to Tobacco, Boycotts Are a Growth Industry, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 1990, at E2.
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more groups are pursuing boycotts than at any time since the 1970s.
“While people are participating less in the political process, as
consumers they see that one way they can exercise power is by where
7
they spend their money and where they don’t.” The increase in these
boycotts has been attributed to many, sometimes interrelated, factors
ranging from “greater public attention to corporate social
responsibility . . . and the increased vulnerability of brands and
8
9
corporate reputations” to the power of the Internet. And it would
not be surprising if, in this current climate of heightened skepticism
regarding the functioning of the markets, backlash via boycotts
further increases.
Within the broader jurisprudential concern of reconciling First
Amendment and antitrust considerations in the context of expressive
yet economically rewarding boycotts is the complicated issue of how
to accomplish this task in light of the increasing centrality of
intellectual property in individuals’ professional lives and society’s
welfare as a whole.
Consider the following public plea: “[The publisher] is breaking
an unwritten contract with the scientific community: being a publisher
of our research carries the responsibility to make our contributions
publicly available at reasonable rates. As an academic community, it
10
is time that we reassert our values.” So read the public letter of two
professors who called for several collective actions including a
11
boycott of the publisher in question. Similarly, scientific researchers
who use mice in studying illness were angered when DuPont, which
had an exclusive patent license for a genetically engineered mouse
(Oncomouse), charged what they deemed an excessive price for the
mouse and also imposed unusually restrictive conditions for sharing
among researchers. Nobel Prize–winning scientist Harold Varmus
6. Steven Greenhouse, A Weapon for Consumers: The Boycott Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 2000, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4.
7. Id.
8. Jill Gabrielle Klein, N. Craig Smith & Andrew John, Why We Boycott: Consumer
Motivations for Boycott Participation and Marketer Responses 1 (Ctr. for Mktg., London Bus.
Sch., Working Paper No. 03-702, 2003), available at http://www.london.edu/facultyandresearch/
research/docs/03-702.pdf.
9. Behrang Rezabakhsh et al., Consumer Power: A Comparison of the Old Economy and
the Internet Economy, 29 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 3, 15 (2006).
10. Open Letter from Peter Walter & Keith Yamamoto, Mission Bay Governance Comm.,
Univ. of Cal., S.F. (undated), available at http://stlq.info/2003/10/call_for_boycott_of_cell_press.
html.
11. For a discussion of the academic publishing controversy, see infra Part IV.C.
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denounced these conditions as “abhorrent,” and he and fellow
12
researchers “went on the warpath.”
The view of the participants in these and many other boycott
efforts is that they were merely seeking to enforce an “invisible
handshake” whereby community norms of fairness and other shared
values—not merely those of the marketplace—determine the terms of
13
trade. At the core of these boycotts was the desire to debate the
market outcome as well as to potentially transform it. The source of
that change could be persuasion on the merits or concern with public
image, or it could result from economic coercion based on the
boycotters’ collective market power. Are these boycotts exercises of
free speech or examples of antitrust violations, and how should the
law address them?
Albert Hirschman’s famous characterization of the options
available to disenchanted market participants constitutes a useful
point of reference for any examination of boycotts. Hirschman
posited that such purchasers had three options: exit (“go over to the
competition”), voice (“‘kick up a fuss’ and thereby force
14
15
improve[ments]”), or boycott (a hybrid of exit and voice). Voice is
interpreted as “any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape
from, an objectionable state of affairs,” and it can take the form of
“individual or collective petition” or “various types of actions and
16
protests, including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion.”
Threatened and consummated boycotts lie on “the border line
17
between voice and exit.” In those instances, either the threat of exit
18
or the promise of reentry are “instrument[s] of voice,” respectively.
Exit and voice are “market and nonmarket forces, that is, economic
19
The academic publishing and
and political mechanisms.”
Oncomouse examples illustrate concretely how boycotts combine
these two approaches. Given the particular significance of the speech

12. Eliot Marshall, A Deluge of Patents Creates Legal Hassles for Research, 288 SCIENCE
255, 256 (2000). For a discussion of the Oncomouse controversy, see infra Part IV.A.
13. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on
Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 736 (1986) (finding that
transactors may avoid doing business with firms whose behavior is perceived as unfair).
14. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 30 (1970).
15. Id. at 86.
16. Id. at 30.
17. Id. at 86.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 19.

GREENE IN FINAL

2010]

2/10/2010 9:09:32 PM

ANTITRUST CENSORSHIP

1043

(voice) interest in fomenting public discourse, this Article calls these
20
expressive boycotts.
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the key First Amendment
and antitrust concepts that provide the basic framework for analysis.
Part II then examines four key cases involving boycotts characterized
by a wide range of speech interests and potential antitrust issues.
These cases underscore both the centrality of categorization within
First Amendment law and the failure of the existing categories to
meaningfully accommodate the speech interest in the expressive
boycotts at issue. As such, the law inadequately protects the speech
interests associated with expressive boycotts when those interests are
inextricably intertwined with economic coercion—the concern of
antitrust law. Part III argues that expressive boycotts constitute a
unique form of speech that merits First Amendment protection, and
Part IV provides four examples of intellectual property boycotts. Part
V offers recommendations for reviewing expressive boycotts that will
help ensure that speech about the market can be as free as the market
itself.
I. LEGAL BASICS
Expressive boycotts pose unique challenges because they can be
vehicles for both the exchange of ideas and economic coercion. Not
surprisingly, then, the First Amendment, the Sherman Antitrust Act,
and a slew of judicial rulings provide the complex backdrop against
which such boycotts must be considered. Part I briefly introduces the
basic contours of these two legal regimes. Antitrust analysis entails
frequent recourse to making tradeoffs regarding economic efficiency.
Moreover, such tradeoffs lie at the core of antitrust’s primary mode of
analysis—the rule of reason. First Amendment law, by contrast,
eschews tradeoffs per se in favor of an intermittently acknowledged,
and often contested, “balancing” process. Parts II and III
demonstrate that what is most important is the extent to which each
regime does or does not account for the values of the other and the
viability of legal outcomes that do not entail one regime entirely
trumping the other regime. Unfortunately, despite the potential for
flexibility inherent in both areas of law, neither legal regime exhibits
flexibility when expressive boycotts are at issue.

20. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 437 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (using the same terminology).
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A. First Amendment
The First Amendment commands that “Congress shall make no
21
Despite its
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”
uncompromising language, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has
stated, the First Amendment, “obviously was not[] intended to give
22
immunity for every possible use of language.” If society does not
protect all speech absolutely, the questions become what speech is
protected and what is the nature of that protection? The purpose of
this Section is not to present the complexities and inconsistencies of
23
First Amendment law, but rather to introduce the most relevant
First Amendment issues given the expressive boycotts at issue. This
Section briefly delineates three general modes of First Amendment
analysis and then considers two key factors within that overarching
framework: the content of the speech at issue and whether conduct is
also involved.
1. Frameworks. Professor Mark Tushnet helpfully delineates
three dominant methods of First Amendment analysis used by the
24
courts. The “inside-outside” mode of analysis distinguishes speech
that is “inside,” over which restrictions are “presumptively
unconstitutional,” from speech that is “outside,” over whose
25
restrictions receive “no special First Amendment scrutiny.” A
second analytical mode is the “‘onion-layer’ [approach], in which
categories of speech receive different degrees of protection[, or]
26
‘standards of scrutiny.’” The primary divergence from the insideoutside mode is the introduction of an additional, intermediate
category “within the ambit of the first amendment” but “ascrib[ed]
27
less-than-full protection.” A third mode, through a different form of
intermediate scrutiny, addresses expressive conduct and evaluates
“content-neutral restrictions” by directly balancing “the impairment

21.
22.
23.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
For an overview of the First Amendment law’s complexities, see 1 RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:64 (2009).
24. Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of Compromise, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419,
422–23 (2009).
25. Id. at 422.
26. Id. at 423.
27. Keith Werhan, The O’Briening of Free Speech Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635, 661
n.157, 662 n.159 (1987).
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of expression against the degree to which the regulation accomplishes
28
the government’s permissible purposes.”
2. Content. In both the first and second modes of First
Amendment analysis, the content of the particular speech at issue
directly informs how it is categorized and, as a consequence, the
extent of its protection. The second mode, which entails different
29
standards of scrutiny, dominates First Amendment law today. The
lowest level of scrutiny takes the form of a “minimal rationality
30
standard” and will typically allow the restraint of speech. Obscenity
is a category of speech receiving this meager scrutiny—hence it can be
31
prohibited. Intermediate scrutiny requires that the restriction on
speech serve a “substantial [governmental] interest” and be “designed
32
carefully to achieve [that end].” This level of scrutiny applies to
commercial speech which “[t]he Constitution . . . accords a lesser
33
protection . . . than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”
The strongest level of protection, heightened scrutiny, requires the
restriction on speech to protect a “compelling state interest” and
34
employ means “narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Political
speech traditionally receives this highest level of First Amendment
protection. The Supreme Court has noted that there is “practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment
35
[is] to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”
Political speech is the paradigmatic example of the content that
the First Amendment strives to protect. Nonetheless, that category of
speech is not coterminous with the bounds of speech to which
heightened scrutiny applies. The Supreme Court has expressly held
that “[n]othing in the First Amendment or our cases discussing its
meaning makes the question whether the adjective ‘political’ can
properly be attached to those beliefs the critical constitutional
28. Tushnet, supra note 24, at 423.
29. See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 2:63 (describing the differing levels of scrutiny applied
by the Supreme Court).
30. Id. § 3:2.
31. Id. § 2:69 (noting that obscene speech “receives no First Amendment protection”).
32. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
33. Id. at 562–63 (citation omitted). Commercial speech is “expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience” and typically applies to speech that
“propos[es] a commercial transaction.” Id. at 561–62.
34. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118
(1991) (quoting Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)).
35. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
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36

inquiry.” Moreover, the Supreme Court, in numerous contexts
besides antitrust, has held unequivocally that the First Amendment
protects speech concerning any number of nonpolitical issues. “[T]he
First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the
extent it can be characterized as political. . . . ‘And the rights of free
speech and a free press are not confined to any field of human
37
interest.’” More specifically, the Court has held that a nonexhaustive
list of topics for which expression would be entitled to “full First
Amendment protection” includes “philosophical, social, artistic,
38
economic, literary, or ethical matters.” Protected speech need not be
political either in content or in context (namely, government
petitioning).
The Petition Clause . . . was inspired by the same ideals of liberty
and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and
assemble. These First Amendment rights are inseparable and there
is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to
statements made in a petition . . . than other First Amendment
39
expressions.

3. Conduct. Speech can be analyzed not only by its content, but
also by its form. When speech mixes with conduct, it forms a hybrid
40
termed “expressive conduct.” “What is ‘speech’ in the constitutional
41
sense?” In exploring this fundamental issue, Frederick Schauer has
noted that what the Constitution actually protects is in some regards
42
broader than the “ordinary language meaning of the word ‘speech.’”
Conduct undertaken for expressive purposes, such as flag burning,
43
can constitute speech warranting First Amendment protection. The
conduct that this Article addresses, boycotting, is frequently a

36. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977).
37. United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967)
(citation omitted).
38. Abood, 431 U.S. at 231.
39. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) (citations omitted).
40. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 11:7.
41. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34
VAND. L. REV. 265, 279 (1981).
42. Id. at 273 (citing Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)).
43. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 11:1 (The Supreme Court has “long recognized that First
Amendment protection for speech extends to more than the use of language”); id. §§ 11:9, 11:18
(discussing the “quintessential symbolic speech problem” of flag desecration and observing that
“[l]aws banning the desecration of flags . . . will normally fail [to pass constitutional muster]”).
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multifaceted undertaking that entails agreement not to purchase a
particular good.
44
United States v. O’Brien is the seminal case regarding contentneutral restrictions on expressive conduct. O’Brien directs courts to
evaluate whether the restriction at issue “furthers an important or
substantial government interest; if the government interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
45
essential to the furtherance of that interest.” O’Brien balancing
permits legitimate conduct regulations even when that conduct is
intertwined with expression. Moreover, “so-called ‘O’Brien
balancing’” contributed to the development of the aforementioned
46
intermediate scrutiny standard applicable to commercial speech.
Within First Amendment law, and constitutional law more generally,
a longstanding debate exists regarding the relationship and relative
47
merits of balancing and categorical analysis. Whether for better or
for worse, O’Brien’s approach permits the Court to provide “some,
but not full protection to a category of speech over which the Court
48
feels ambivalent.” For the expressive boycotts at issue in this Article,
the source of judicial malaise is clearly the desire to protect antitrust
values.
***
Part II explores what First Amendment protections, if any, have
been accorded to economic boycotts undertaken for political
purposes as well as potential pecuniary gain. As this Article
demonstrates, notwithstanding the complexity of First Amendment
law generally, within the antitrust context judicial rulings regarding
expressive boycotts are relatively simple and overly simplistic.

44. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
45. Id. at 377.
46. Werhan, supra note 27, at 637.
47. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 294–95 (1992) (“Attitudes about which is better—
categorization or balancing—have fluctuated over time. . . . oscillat[ing] in an endless
dialectic . . . .”).
48. Werhan, supra note 27, at 663.
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B. Antitrust
Although “not constitutional in origin,” the significance of
49
antitrust law should not be understated. The Supreme Court has
characterized antitrust laws as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise.
They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and
our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of
50
our fundamental personal freedoms.” This Section briefly delineates
how antitrust law evaluates boycotts—collective actions undertaken
by market participants to influence the decisions (particularly those
51
regarding pricing) of other market participants. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act supplies the relevant antitrust stricture and prohibits
52
any “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.”
The primary judicial gloss on that language has been to read into it
53
the requirement that the prohibited restraints be “unreasonable.”
This Article treats a conventional Sherman Act Section 1 antitrust
case as one in which no credible speech argument can be made.
Consider, for example, the proverbial smoke-filled room in which
competitors fix prices or divide markets. For instant purposes, the key
features of Section 1 are the conspiracy requirement, the role of per
se versus rule of reason analysis, and the offense of price fixing.
1. Conspiracy. Section 1 addresses unreasonable restraints
resulting from concerted, as opposed to unilateral, acts. As such, “the
antitrust plaintiff should present direct or circumstantial evidence that
reasonably tends to prove that the [conspirators] ‘had a conscious
49. See James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First Amendment, and
the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65, 120 (1985) (“Competition policy, while not
constitutional in origin, has a bearing that is only slightly less eminent.”). Hurwitz attributes
competition policy’s “eminence . . . [to] the fact that one of the most critical foundations of a
strong democracy is a strong economy . . . and competition has been designated as the
protecting and guiding force for the economy.” Id.
50. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (referring to the
Sherman Antitrust Act).
51. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 536 (1978) (“In
antitrust law, a boycott is a ‘concerted refusal to deal’ with a disfavored purchaser or seller.”
(quoting Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1977))). For an analysis
of the different types of boycotts and concerted refusals to deal more generally, see LAWRENCE
A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK
295–315 (2d ed. 2006).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
53. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“Although the Sherman Act, by its terms,
prohibits every agreement ‘in restraint of trade,’ this Court has long recognized that Congress
intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.”).
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54

Stated alternatively,
commitment to a common scheme.’”
“[c]ircumstances must reveal ‘a unity of purpose or a common design
and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful
55
arrangement.’”
In conventional antitrust cases, the conspirators strive to conceal
their joint conduct rather than “seek notoriety” such as through press
coverage “both because they seek to escape detection and because
they have no wider audience beyond the participants and the
56
target.” By contrast, the boycotts at issue in this Article are
expressive and, therefore, often typified by very public, jointly
undertaken activities including petitions and statements to the press.
As such, whereas establishing a conspiracy often constitutes an
extremely challenging hurdle to those bringing conventional antitrust
actions, this requirement is likely to be deemed self-evidently satisfied
57
for expressive boycotts.
2. Unreasonable Restraints. Assuming arguendo the existence of
a conspiracy, the next step in the antitrust analysis is to discern the
type of allegedly anticompetitive restraint at issue. One consequence
that often flows from this determination is identifying whether per se
(automatic condemnation for inherently suspect conduct) or rule of
reason (balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects) analysis is
warranted. The mere designation of a boycott, also termed a
concerted refusal to deal, typically provides an insufficient basis for
58
determining the proper legal analysis. Although “there is often no
59
bright line separating per se from [r]ule of [r]eason analysis,” the
determination of which legal standard applies often has profound
54. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (quoting Edward J.
Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980)).
55. Id. (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946)); see also
Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954)
(“Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into
the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but ‘conscious parallelism’ has not yet read
conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.”).
56. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 451 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. For a discussion that questions the wisdom of these applications, see infra Part V.A.2.
58. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 542–43 (1978) (noting
the “marked lack of uniformity in defining” the term “boycott” for purposes of the Sherman
Act).
59. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) (“Per se rules may require
considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evidence justifies a presumption of
anticompetitive conduct.”).
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consequences on the ultimate outcome, particularly when, as in the
expressive boycotts at issue in this Article, free speech concerns are
implicated.
3. Per Se. Conduct subject to per se condemnation is that
deemed both inherently pernicious in terms of its anticompetitive
60
effects and lacking in redeeming procompetitive effects. As such, it
is “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm [it has] caused or the
61
business excuse for [its] use.” A boycott would be deemed per se
illegal if, for example, it is among horizontal competitors meant to
62
63
disadvantage a competitor or it furthers a price-fixing scheme. Price
fixing is considered so harmful to society that it is one of the few
antitrust offenses subject to criminal as well as civil sanctions. It is
important to understand the rationale for this treatment, the breadth
of conduct that constitutes price fixing, and the unavailability of
certain defenses.
Pricing is often referred to as “the central nervous system of the
64
economy.” Harm to that vital system, therefore, is not narrowly
confined to conspiracies geared to establish a specific price in lieu of
the price determined by the market. Any agreements undertaken to
interfere with the marketplace as a pricing mechanism, whether they
be for “raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing” prices, are
65
per se illegal. Because price fixing is per se illegal, conspirators’
actual or likely ability to affect prices is irrelevant. It is no defense to
66
argue that a conspiracy enjoys no market power. Consequently, a
boycott undertaken in response to price levels, but lacking market
power, would be condemned under the antitrust laws. Another
nondefense is the alleged reasonableness or fairness of the pricing

60. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1939) (finding that activities are
unreasonable “because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue”).
61. Id.
62. E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
63. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 434 (1990) (noting the threat
posed to the free market).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940)
(discussing the threat of price-fixing agreements).
65. Id. at 223.
66. See id. at 224 n.59 (indicating that market power is not necessary for conviction).
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67

advocated or effectuated by the boycotters. The principle underlying
the rejection of such defenses is clear: “The Sherman Act reflects a
legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only
lower prices, but also better goods and services. . . . Even assuming
occasional exceptions to the presumed consequences of competition,
the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether
68
competition is good or bad.”
4. Rule of Reason. Despite the apparent frequency of arguably
per se illegal acts (price fixing) among expressive boycotters, most
types of conduct are analyzed under the rule of reason. This balancing
test requires courts to weigh the pro- and anticompetitive effects of
the restraint at issue before determining whether it is “unreasonable.”
Whether a restriction is reasonable or not depends upon how it
affects consumer welfare. This inquiry into consumer welfare is the
lodestar of antitrust analysis; it is narrowly defined in economic terms
69
and encompasses the price, quantity, and quality of goods offered.
The underlying substantive question concerns what pro- versus
anticompetitive effects are legally cognizable under the antitrust laws.
The inquiry into anticompetitive effects includes both actual and
inferred harms. There is little or no recognition of noneconomic
benefits.
Depending on the facts of the case, including the duration of the
alleged misconduct, actual competitive effects such as a change in
price in response to the conduct at issue may or may not be
discernable. Consequently, society seeks to identify not only those
arrangements with demonstrated “detrimental effects” but also those
70
with “the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.”
When actual effects are not present or cannot be discerned, courts use
the market share of the alleged bad actor as a proxy for harm. Either
a buyer or seller can exercise market power. With regard to sellers,
the point of view from which it is usually defined, “market power is

67. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (“It has long been settled
that an agreement to fix prices is unlawful per se. It is no excuse that the prices fixed are
themselves reasonable.”).
68. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
69. Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation
Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 1264 (2009); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and
the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1982) (“[T]he overriding economic goal of
antitrust laws is to maximize consumer welfare through the efficient allocation of resources.”).
70. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986).
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the seller’s ability to raise and sustain a price increase without losing
71
so many sales that it must rescind the increase.” With regard to
buyers, therefore, it is a buyer’s ability to force a sustained price
decrease. Although courts’ “efforts to define market power is still a
72
work in progress,” the key feature is “power-over-price.” Market
power, within an antitrust market (defined in terms of both
geography and product), is a reflection of market share. The market
share threshold above which market power, and therefore,
73
competitive harm, is found varies depending on numerous factors.
5. Noneconomic and Other Nonconsiderations. The law that this
Article has summarized, with its emphasis on economic analysis,
illustrates the trend over the last few decades whereby economic
74
efficiency has come to thoroughly dominate antitrust analysis while
noneconomic considerations have fallen into disregard and, at times,
disrepute. This Section briefly explains those dynamics and lays the
groundwork for understanding their implications for the expressive
boycotts at issue in this Article.
Noneconomic considerations could, in theory, encompass all
factors not directly implicating economic efficiency. In practice,
however, “noneconomic” typically refers to concerns such as the
“prosperity of small businesses; . . . autonomy for independent
75
business people; [and] political and economic deconcentration.”
Professor Robert Pitofsky, among others, has criticized the increasing
hostility of antitrust to such factors: “It is bad history, bad policy, and
bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust
76
laws.” But this general trend, fueled by what is known as the
Chicago School of antitrust, has become dominant and has largely

71. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 51, at 26.
72. Id. at 29.
73. Id. at 30 (stating that the “tolerance for different levels of market power depend[s] on
the nature of the violation” and, indirectly, upon the “feasibility of remedial action”).
74. See Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating for Efficiency in Health Care Through the Antitrust
Laws, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 465, 466–67.
75. Jean Wegman Burns, Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and the Real World, 62 FORDHAM
L. REV. 597, 598 n.6 (1993).
76. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051
(1979); see also id. at 1058–60 (elaborating on the criticism). For an introduction to this general
issue, see John J. Flynn, Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political, and
Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977).
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persisted even in a post–Chicago School environment. This Article’s
immediate purpose is not to revisit the philosophical underpinnings of
those schools of thought but rather to explore some of the more
practical reasons that Chicago adherents have offered for rejecting
noneconomic considerations and to apply those insights in contexts in
which First Amendment and antitrust issues commingle.
With regard to noneconomic considerations, Judge Frank
Easterbrook has remarked that:
Goals based on something other than efficiency (or its close proxy
consumers’ welfare) really call on judges to redistribute
income . . . . Judges have no metric, and we ought not attribute to
Congress a decision to grant judges a political power that lacks any
78
semblance of “legal” criteria.

Judge Richard Posner shares the sentiment that an economic
efficiency objective enables judges to develop antitrust rules that are
79
“reasonably objective.” He further argues that if courts were to rely
on noneconomic considerations to develop antitrust law, “they would
80
be completely at sea and might also shipwreck the economy.” It is, at
a minimum, unclear that these Chicago School proponents are correct
regarding either the precision introduced by economic analysis or the
imprecision that would be introduced by noneconomic
81
considerations. It is important, however, to recognize this sentiment
and how, over time, it has resulted in a legal regime that has become

77. See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 4–6
(2007) (explaining both the utility and the shortcomings of the Chicago School/post–Chicago
School framework).
78. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1704 (1986).
79. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 211 (1987).
80. Id.
81. Pitofsky, supra note 76, at 1060 (“[A]n exclusively economic approach reflects an
unrealistically optimistic view of the certainty introduced by that kind of analysis, and . . . the
introduction of non-economic factors does not result in an undue interference with effective
enforcement.”).
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increasingly inhospitable to either the recognition or reintegration of
83
noneconomic considerations.
What these judges’ arguments underscore is that, in addition to
substantive qualms regarding the propriety of recognizing
noneconomic factors, they view introducing such factors into
balancing tests as also posing intractable practical challenges. Perhaps
it is not surprising that, in the two contexts in which antitrust yields to
constitutional imperatives (petitioning government and federalism), it
does so by conferring immunity.
6. Constitutional Considerations. In addition to protecting free
speech, the First Amendment also enshrines the right to “petition the
84
Government for a redress of grievances.” And it is within this
political context that noneconomic constitutional considerations
85
typically trump the antitrust laws.
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
86
Freight, Inc., the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff truckers’
argument that the railroads’ “publicity campaign against the
truckers,” which encouraged legislation beneficial to the railroads and
87
harmful to the truckers, violated the antitrust laws. It held
expansively that, “no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be
predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or
88
enforcement of the laws.” The Sherman Act regulates business
89
activity, not political activity. The questions of whether a law should
82. See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU
L. REV. 1265, 1332 n.451 (observing within the rule of reason context that “no courts . . . have
explicitly invoked noneconomic rationales for their decisions”).
83. See, e.g., Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines
in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 822–23 (2006) (noting that the economic
framework within merger law is unaccommodating of noneconomic factors).
84. U.S. CONST. amend I.
85. The seminal case on this issue, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), arguably based antitrust immunity upon some combination of
First Amendment considerations and statutory construction of the Sherman Act. Hurwitz, supra
note 49, at 79 n.46. The Court’s ruling in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508 (1972), “clearly rest[ed] on first amendment principles.” Hurwitz, supra note 49, at
79 n.46; see also Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 1002 (2003) (observing that case law suggests Noerr is based on both
“constitutional principles” and “statutory interpretation” and arguing that “the core of the
doctrine is constitutional”).
86. E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
87. Id. at 129, 144.
88. Id. at 135.
89. Id. at 140.
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pass and how it should be enforced were the responsibility of the
90
legislative and executive branches of government. The United
States’ representative democracy largely “depends upon the ability of
91
the people to make their wishes known to their representatives.”
Noerr and its progeny give “primacy to first amendment
considerations” and subordinate competition policy considerations
through a broad grant of immunity from antitrust claims regarding
“efforts to influence legislative, executive, administrative, and
92
adjudicatory conduct by government.” Notwithstanding the broad
range of that protection, like the First Amendment upon which it is
based, Noerr immunity is not absolute. Petitioners’ invocation of
governmental processes in order to generate competitive burdens
rather than to “achieve the legitimate outcome of the process
93
invoked” constitutes a “sham” and is not immunized.
“[T]he boundary between antitrust enforcement and
constitutionally protected activity” is marked by the state action
94
doctrine as well as the Noerr doctrine. State action immunity is a
judicially created doctrine that reflects “the need to subordinate
national competition policy, as embodied in the Sherman Act, to a
95
state’s right to assert regulatory autonomy.” In the seminal case
Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court observed:
In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution,
the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority . . . . [t]he Sherman Act makes no
mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended
96
to restrain state action or official action directed by a state.

State action immunity is only available when, among other things, the
restraint at issue is “one clearly articulated and affirmatively

90. Id. at 137.
91. Id.
92. Hurwitz, supra note 49, at 66; see also Lao, supra note 85, at 972–76 (delineating how
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), and California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited expanded Noerr immunity to petitioning of the executive
and the courts/administrative agencies respectively.).
93. Hurwitz, supra note 49, at 93.
94. Id. at 76.
95. Hillary Greene, Articulating Trade-Offs: The Political Economy of State Action
Immunity, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 827, 828.
96. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
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97

expressed as state policy.” It is employed “when antitrust clearly
could override state law and when the antitrust statutes do not in
terms defer, but the court thinks state policy warrants greater
98
deference than Congress has expressly granted.” As such, Professors
Lawrence Sullivan and Warren Grimes have observed how this
99
doctrine “widen[s] the states’ power to impose economic norms.” In
particular, this antitrust exemption “conditions the relationship
between state law and federal antitrust by factoring into the analysis a
public interest other than competitive effect: namely the states’
interest in such non-competitive goals as its regulation seeks to
100
attain.”
***
It is likely that antitrust’s largely binary approach of either
ignoring or immunizing noneconomic factors contributed to a
comparable application of First Amendment law in which the stark
choice of strongly protected versus unprotected speech emerged, and
a more balanced outcome—regarding speech within this boycott
context—was not entertained.
II. ANTITRUST MONOPOLIZATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
When allegedly, or even indisputably, anticompetitive conduct
arguably implicates speech concerns, should antitrust law alone be
dispositive or should the First Amendment have a role to play?
Unfortunately, when those with some economic interest undertake
expressive boycotts, First Amendment values are likely forsaken in
the name of antitrust law’s protection of free enterprise. This Part
explains the origins of this troubling state of the law. It discusses the
key cases within this context and highlights how they epitomize a
categorical approach to the First Amendment and, more specifically,

97. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
The controversy currently surrounding state action immunity reflects the underlying
disagreement regarding the “appropriate balance between federalism and federal [antitrust]
policy.” Greene, supra note 95, at 827. Most critics of this doctrine seek to restrict its availability
and rely, with varying degrees of candor, upon a strictly economic efficiency–based analysis
instead of grappling openly with the question of what value should be accorded federalism when
antitrust lies in the balance. Id. at 828.
98. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 51, at 799.
99. Id. at 800.
100. Id.
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how the implementation of that approach within the antitrust context
became skewed and inadequately protective of speech.
The four key cases discussed in this Part illustrate the extremely
wide range of circumstances encompassed in the term boycott. The
identities of the boycotters vary as do their goals and targets. When
taken individually, each case involves a different combination of these
basic characteristics and raises different First Amendment issues.
Collectively, however, these cases underscore the centrality of
categorization in First Amendment law and the potentially extreme
consequences when antitrust is also involved. What emerges is a
boycott continuum of sorts fully dominated, at the extremes, by either
antitrust or First Amendment values, depending upon whether the
speech is cast as purely economically motivated or purely political.
When, however, a potential conflict between the legal demands of
these two vital areas of law exists—meaning that speech with both
characteristics is present—the Supreme Court has resorted to either
ignoring the complex nature of the speech involved or engaging in an
overly simplistic bifurcation of political and economic speech.
A. Boycotts and Naked Price Fixing
To fully understand when the First Amendment exempts
possibly anticompetitive conduct from the antitrust laws, one must
understand not only when no such exemption is found, but also the
extreme circumstances under which no credible argument could even
be made. Perhaps the most infamous of those circumstances concerns
so-called “naked” price fixing, which has earned that moniker due to
101
the absence of any redeeming procompetitive features.
Assume that purchasers collectively refused to buy a particular
good unless sellers decreased their prices. Further assume that the
purchasers at issue were intermediate buyers who used the good in
question as an input for a final good to be purchased by an end user
or final consumer. This scenario of an upstream boycott used to
facilitate price fixing captures the essence of Mandeville Island
102
Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co. In that case, the Supreme
103
Court condemned the conduct as per se illegal. The precedential
significance of the case stemmed from the application of per se

101.
102.
103.

For a discussion of per se illegality, see supra Part I.B.
Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 222–23 (1948).
Id. at 243.
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condemnation to buyer as well as seller price fixing. The Court’s
analysis was based on an economic analysis of consumer welfare and
reflected a concern that buyer rigging of the marketplace would
105
impact the economic situation of the sellers. Most important for the
purposes of this Article, however, is the complete absence of any
discussion of speech or the First Amendment in the Mandeville Island
Farms opinion. Speech among the conspirators was merely the
mechanism by which price fixing among horizontal competitors, the
cardinal sin in antitrust, was effectuated. There was no expressive
component to the communication at issue and, therefore, it was
implicitly categorized as nonspeech for First Amendment purposes.
Full enforcement of the antitrust laws did not entail any tradeoff of
First Amendment values. This rationale, implicit in Mandeville Island
Farms, received its fullest articulation by the Supreme Court the
following Term:
It is true that the [anticompetitive] agreements and course of
conduct [involving price fixing] here were as in most instances
brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been
deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a
course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the
constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it
practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in
restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies
106
deemed injurious to society.

Given the necessity of drawing some distinctions regarding speech,
the question then becomes what characteristics render
communication subject to First Amendment protection.
B. Boycotts and Government
At the opposite end of the boycott spectrum from naked price
fixing lies the case of Missouri v. National Organization for Women,
107
Inc. (NOW). Here, full protection of the First Amendment, in the
form of a Sherman Act exemption, does not come at the expense of
any self-evident antitrust values. At issue was a convention boycott
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 235–36.
Id. at 240–42.
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (citation omitted).
Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. (NOW), 620 F.2d 1301, 1302 (8th Cir. 1980).
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organized by NOW “against all states [including Missouri] that had
108
not ratified the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).” As a
result, those sectors of the Missouri economy, such as motels and
109
restaurants, that catered to convention-based business lost revenue.
Missouri’s Attorney General John Ashcroft brought a claim for
injunctive relief under the antitrust law, which the district court
110
denied.
111
The Eighth Circuit cast the issue of first impression as whether
“a politically motivated but economically tooled boycott participated
in and organized by noncompetitors of those who suffered as a result
112
of the boycott” violated the antitrust laws. The prominent role of
motivation (political goal of influencing legislators) and identity
(noncompetitors of targets) of the boycotters in formulating the issue
113
is noteworthy. Many of the “most relevant” facts of the case
pertained to these same considerations: “The ERA is not a ‘financial,’
114
‘economic,’ or ‘commercial’ piece of legislation.” “The boycott is
noncommercial in that its participants are not business interests and
115
its purpose is not increased profits.” “The boycott is ‘non-economic’
as it was not undertaken to advance the economic self-interests of the
116
participants.” “NOW’s target is the state legislature, the supreme
117
policy-making body of the state.”
What is particularly telling about this central distinction,
characterized
variously
as
commercial/noncommercial
or
economic/noneconomic throughout the ruling, is that the court
acknowledges (albeit in a footnote at the end of the discussion) that
“we do not rest our decision in this case upon the basis that the
boycott was noncommercial and noneconomic. Our decision is based
upon the right to use political activities to petition the government, as
118
was the underlying factor in Noerr.”
108. Id. For a discussion of the conspiracy issue, see supra Part I.B.
109. NOW, 620 F.2d at 1302.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 1304 (“This court would be remiss if it did not acknowledge at the outset that
the specific question this case presents has not been decided by the Supreme Court or, for that
matter, by any other appellate court.”).
112. Id. at 1302.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1311.
115. Id. at 1303.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1315 n.16 (emphasis added); see also supra notes 86–93 and accompanying text.
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The NOW decision, therefore, turns upon the categorization of
the boycott as political speech, which, in turn, reflects the context of
petitioning government. The “economic interest” discussion, although
legally unnecessary, can be understood as reinforcing the propriety of
what otherwise would have been a mechanical categorization of
political speech based on petitioning. The speech is deemed political
not only because it sought to influence government policy but also
because the speakers lacked economic self-interest. It is telling that
the lack of economic self-interest received such prominence given its
fully acknowledged legal irrelevance. As will become apparent, this
attention to boycotters’ motivations (economic interests) would
reappear in future rulings in which, unlike in NOW, they would
ultimately become outcome determinative.
C. Boycotts and Economic Interest
Given the NOW court’s firm reliance on the Noerr doctrine,
what role would the boycotters’ motives—whether economic or
noneconomic—play in antitrust cases in the absence of a First
Amendment immunity based on government petitioning? This
Section focuses on the Supreme Court’s answer to that question and a
related variant in two subsequent cases. The rulings reflect an overly
simplistic categorization of the speech at issue and, as such, they
represent missed opportunities to explore meaningfully the
relationship between economically and politically motivated speech
in a boycott setting.
1. Economic Interest in Boycott Mechanism. The first case at
119
issue, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
involved a 1966
NAACP-organized boycott in Claiborne County, Mississippi that
produced rulings from the Chancery Court of Hinds County as well as
120
the Mississippi and United States Supreme Courts.
The Claiborne County dispute arose when the NAACP
“presented white elected officials with a list of particularized
demands for racial equality and integration. The complainants did not
receive a satisfactory response and . . . several hundred black persons
121
voted to place a boycott on white merchants in the area.” Several
targeted merchants brought suit in state court on grounds of tortious
119.
120.
121.

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
Id. at 889–96.
Id. at 889 (footnote omitted).
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interference with business relations as well as antitrust grounds,
seeking both to enjoin future boycott activity and recover losses
122
occasioned by the boycott. The Chancery Court found in favor of
123
the merchants on both grounds and awarded $1,250,699 in damages.
With regard to liability, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed in
part, holding that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has seen fit to
hold [that] boycotts to achieve political ends are not a violation of the
124
Sherman Act.” The Mississippi Supreme Court, however, affirmed
125
the finding of liability as a matter of tort law and remanded to the
126
lower court for a recalculation of damages.
The Mississippi
Supreme Court’s ruling was appealed on nonantitrust grounds to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the Court’s ruling and its
discussion of the First Amendment issues at stake are relevant to, and
127
were applied subsequently in, the antitrust context.
The Court held that, “[w]hile States have broad power to
regulate economic activity, we do not find a comparable right to
prohibit peaceful political activity such as that found in the boycott in
128
this case.” The Court, reminiscent of the Eighth Circuit’s approach
in the NOW case, focused on the boycotters’ political motivation,
which the Court took great pains to characterize as noneconomic.
The Court reasoned that, “[t]he right of the States to regulate
economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition against a
nonviolent, politically motivated boycott designed to force
governmental and economic change and to effectuate rights
129
guaranteed by the Constitution itself.” The Court further opined
that, “[t]here is no suggestion that the NAACP . . . or the individual
defendants were in competition with the white businesses or that the
130
boycott arose from parochial economic interests.” To the contrary,
the Court already had noted that the trial court found an antitrust
122. Id. at 889–90.
123. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So.2d 1290, 1293 (Miss. 1980).
124. Id. at 1301.
125. Id. at 1301–02.
126. Id. at 1307.
127. For a discussion of this issue and an examination of the Supreme Court case FTC v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990), see infra Part II.C.2.
128. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982).
129. Id. at 914 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 915 (emphasis added) (quoting Henry v. First Nat’l Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d
291, 303 (1979)). The Supreme Court stated that the state trial court found an antitrust violation
“on the ground that the boycott had diverted black patronage from the white merchants to
black merchants.” Id. at 893.
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violation “on the ground that the boycott had diverted black
patronage from the white merchants to black merchants and to other
131
merchants located out of Claiborne County.” More specifically,
[t]he trial court found that some of the boycott leaders were major
stockholders in a grocery and clothing store called “Our Mart,”
which as a result of the boycott “became an instant success.” . . . The
trial court also found that similar boycotted businesses lost sales and
132
profits during the period of Our Mart’s increase.

An argument made by counsel for the boycotted merchants
when briefing the issue regarding which individuals were part of the
alleged conspiracy has relevance here:
One factor on which the state courts might have relied is that as the
owner of a grocery store that competed with boycotted stores Mrs.
Dee had a financial stake in the boycott. A lower level of
participation in boycott activities may have been required for her
and for other petitioners . . . who owned competing establishments
133
or who owned stock in Our Mart.

The presence of economic interest on the part of at least one
prominent boycott organizer was widely discussed. A New York
Times Magazine profile of Charles Evers, a central figure in the
Claiborne County boycott, noted that “‘some of the most bitter
criticism of Evers has stemmed from his performance as a
businessman’ and the fact that ‘he opened his stores in unseemly
proximity to the time when white competitors were being hit by the
134
boycotts he had initiated.’” Many boycotters in Claiborne County
“traveled to Fayette (about twenty miles away) after 1967, when
135
Evers opened a shopping center there.”

131. Id. at 892.
132. Brief of Respondents at *45, Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (No. 81-202), 1982 WL
608672 (citing Chancery Court opinion at 25b). Additionally, the boycotters’ petition included
the following demand: “[a]ll stores must employ Negro clerks and cashiers.” Claiborne
Hardware, 458 U.S. at 900.
133. Respondents’ Supplemental Brief at *17, Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (No.
81-202), 1982 WL 608673.
134. EMILYE CROSBY, A LITTLE TASTE OF FREEDOM: THE BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE
IN CLAIBORNE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI 218 (2005) (quoting Walter Rugaber, “We Can’t Cuss
White People Anymore. It’s in Our Hands Now,” N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 4, 1968, at SM12); see
also id. at 134 (“Many shoppers turned to local black businesses, which experienced a major
boost in sales.”).
135. Id. at 134–35.
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It is inaccurate to claim, as did the Supreme Court, that no
136
economic self-interest was involved. To what can one attribute the
Supreme Court’s characterization regarding the boycotters’ interests?
As a practical matter, after disclaiming the existence of any economic
motivation on the part of the boycotters, the Court categorized the
expressive conduct as political speech by allowing the boycotters the
137
strongest First Amendment defense. Perhaps the Court feared, and
properly so, that recognizing any complexity in the boycotters’
motivations would diminish their First Amendment protections. In
fact, Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp have argued with respect to
Claiborne Hardware that a First Amendment defense “should be
denied . . . to a black merchant who stands to benefit directly from
138
any decline in business to its white competitors.”
Perhaps the Court’s statement, quoted previously, is more
accurately understood as emphasizing that the boycott arose from a
139
political objective, notwithstanding any economic self-interest.
Based on any reasonable measure, the Claiborne County boycott
sought to affirm the constitutional rights and basic human dignities of
140
its African-American citizens. It is telling that even a widely
celebrated political boycott still implicated economic interest on some
level. This further weakens the wisdom and basic feasibility of a
heavy reliance on binary categorization (political or economic
141
speech) when expressive boycotts are at issue.
136. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
137. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 915.
138. 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 191–92 (3d ed. 2006); see also Transcript
of Oral Argument, FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (No. 881198), available at http://www.oyez.com/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_88_1198/argument (noting
that, under the rule proposed by the FTC in Superior Court Trial Lawyers and adopted by the
Court, the Claiborne Hardware boycotters would be condemned as per se illegal given that
some had “opened a retail store in competition with the white merchants.”).
139. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 915.
140. See generally CROSBY, supra note 134 (providing a detailed analysis of the civil rights
objectives).
141. See, e.g., Kay P. Kindred, When First Amendment Values and Competition Policy
Collide: Resolving the Dilemma of Mixed-Motive Boycotts, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 710–12 (1992)
(discussing the “elusive distinction” between commercially and economically motivated
boycotts particularly within the context of “mixed-motive” boycotts). Reliance upon
categorization more generally has also been subject to criticism. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 426 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he concept of
‘categories’ fits poorly with the complex reality of expression. Few dividing lines in First
Amendment law are straight and unwavering, and efforts at categorization inevitably give rise
only to fuzzy boundaries.”).
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2. Economic Interest in Boycott Outcomes. A decade after
Claiborne Hardware, the Supreme Court revisited that seminal case
and applied it to a boycott challenged on antitrust grounds. The case,
142
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, constitutes the Court’s
most recent pronouncement on this particular issue at the interface of
First Amendment and antitrust law.
In 1983, “[p]ursuant to a well-publicized plan, a group of lawyers
[from the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association (Trial Lawyers)]
agreed not to represent indigent criminal defendants in the District of
Columbia Superior Court until the District of Columbia government
143
increased the lawyers’ compensation.” In the years preceding the
boycott, various bar associations voiced concerns “about the low fees
144
paid to [Criminal Justice Act (CJA)] lawyers.” In the year before
the boycott, various groups, including the boycotters, had “sought to
persuade the District to increase CJA rates to at least $35 per hour.
Despite what appeared to be uniform support for the bill, it did not
145
pass.” In mid-1983, the Mayor of Washington, D.C. met with the
Trial Lawyers and, despite expressing support for their cause, did not
146
increase the rate. The Trial Lawyers formed a “strike committee”
147
and proceeded to boycott providing legal services. The impact on
the court system was profound, and the D.C. government ultimately
capitulated and agreed to a schedule for increasing rates to the levels
148
sought by the boycotters. The lawsuit in question was instituted not
by the boycott targets, the most likely litigants, but rather by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which charged the lawyers with
149
“conspir[ing] to fix prices and to conduct a boycott.”
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Morton Needelman
conducted a three-week trial and found that the FTC had proven all
150
the facts necessary to establish an antitrust violation. The ALJ
142. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). See generally Donald
I. Baker, The Superior Court Trial Lawyers Case—A Battle on the Frontier Between Politics and
Antitrust, in ANTITRUST STORIES 257 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007)
(providing a broad discussion of the case written by counsel for the boycotters).
143. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 414.
144. Id. at 415. Under the auspices of the Criminal Justice Act, the D.C. government hired
attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 416.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 418.
149. In re Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 107 F.T.C. 510, 512 (1986).
150. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 419 (discussing the trial).
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rejected the Trial Lawyers’ defenses including the argument that it
“was a form of political action protected by the First Amendment”
151
under Claiborne Hardware. Despite his own determinations on the
facts and the defenses, the ALJ dismissed the complaint given that
the D.C. government had been “so supportive of the boycotters’
demands (or to put it somewhat differently . . . the identity of the
152
victim was . . . so elusive).” The ALJ concluded by stating, “I see no
point in striving resolutely for an antitrust triumph in this sensitive
area when this particular case can be disposed of on a more pragmatic
153
basis—there was no harm done.”
The ALJ’s “pragmatic moderation found no favor with the
154
FTC,” which condemned the conduct as per se illegal. On appeal,
the D.C. Circuit found that the conduct in question constituted “a
155
classic restraint of trade” under the Sherman Act. The court of
appeals, however, also found that the “boycott did contain an element
156
of expression warranting First Amendment protection.” Applying
the legal standard of United States v. O’Brien, the court held that
restricting the boycott could not be justified unless it was “no greater
157
than is essential” to an important governmental interest. In essence,
per se condemnation was inappropriate and the FTC was required to
“prove rather than presume that the evil against which the Sherman
158
Act is directed looms in the conduct it condemns.” As such, the
court vacated the FTC’s order and remanded for a determination of
159
whether respondents possessed “significant market power.”

151. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 107 F.T.C. at 551–54.
152. Id. at 560.
153. Id. at 561. Commissioner Michael Pertschuk, dissenting from the Commission’s
decision to institute this action, expressed a similar sentiment: “All this is not to say that
conspiracies by lawyers or other professionals to raise fees are not antitrust violations, or that I
would not enthusiastically support a case challenging such a conspiracy in a different set of
circumstances in the future. In this case at this time, we should spend our time on more harmful
conduct.” Id. at 513 (Pertschuk, Comm’r, dissenting).
154. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 419.
155. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
156. Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 249; see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (“[A]
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it . . . furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest . . . [and] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.”).
158. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 856 F.2d at 250.
159. Id. at 252; see also Paul G. Mahoney, Note, A Market Power Test for Noncommercial
Boycotts, 93 YALE L.J. 523, 524, 537 (1984) (advocating an “economic effects test” based on
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The Supreme Court rejected the “creative conclusions of the
ALJ and the Court of Appeals” and condemned the lawyers in the
exact same manner as it did the naked price fixers in Mandeville
160
161
Island Farms. Both acts were found per se illegal. Consistent with
legal precedent, discussion of the boycotters’ economic and political
motivations figured prominently in the decision, albeit for different
reasons.
The Court characterized the boycott as price fixing among
horizontal competitors and refused to consider the “social
162
justifications proffered for . . . [the] restraint of trade.”
The
Sherman Act, observed the Court, “precludes inquiry into the
163
question whether competition [and its outcome] is good or bad.” As
such, “[it] is no excuse that the prices fixed are themselves
164
reasonable.” The Court then considered, and rejected, the Trial
165
Lawyers’ defense based on Claiborne Hardware.
The Court
declined to find any First Amendment speech based on a decisive
difference between the boycotters before the Court and those in
Claiborne Hardware: “No matter how altruistic the motives of
respondents may have been, it is undisputed that their immediate
objective was to increase the price that they would be paid for their
166
services.” By contrast, those in Claiborne Hardware “sought no
167
special advantage for themselves.”
Upon rejecting the boycotters’ proffered defenses, the Court not
only applied per se condemnation but also went much further, stating
that, “O’Brien would offer [the boycotters] no protection even if their
168
boycott were uniquely expressive.” “A rule that requires courts to
apply the antitrust laws ‘prudently and with sensitivity’ whenever an
economic boycott has an ‘expressive component’ would create a
169
gaping hole in the fabric of those laws.” In sum, any speech interests

market power as striking the appropriate balance between First Amendment and antitrust
values within the context of noncommercial boycotts).
160. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 421 (1990).
161. Id. at 429–30.
162. Id. at 424.
163. Id.
164. Id. (quoting Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 466 U.S. 643, 647 (1980)).
165. Id. at 426 (rejecting the Noerr defense).
166. Id. at 427.
167. Id. at 426.
168. Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 431–32.
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inherent in the conduct at issue are trumped not only by the
government’s substantive interest in antitrust regulation but also by
the government’s “administrative efficiency interests in antitrust
170
regulation.”
The Superior Court Trial Lawyers majority’s elevation of the
Sherman Act over any speech-related concerns constituted a
significant departure from much First Amendment jurisprudence,
notwithstanding that the distinction upon which it was based—
political speech as distinct from economically motivated speech—
171
bore a resemblance to some of the relevant precedent. The ruling is
notable for its categorization of what does and does not constitute
political speech. The manner in which this distinction is drawn proves
to be outcome determinative and establishes a clear hierarchy
wherein protecting competition trumps free speech.
The rule articulated in Superior Court Trial Lawyers is very
clear, and this Article argues that this clarity is deceptive and
unfortunate. Within this antitrust context, First Amendment
protection appears to extend only so far as an unduly circumscribed
conception of the “political.” To the extent that the speech at issue
petitions the government, this factor is of little moment. The presence
of political speech within the petitioning context reflects the
ostensible target of the speech. Under Noerr, the First Amendment
broadly protects government petitioning regardless of the petitioner’s
172
economic interest or motivation. A protectable interest in political
speech more generally, however, is reserved for a category of
expression defined only in the negative as speech in which the
speaker has no economic interest. As a result of this extremely crude
method of categorization in cases raising competition policy issues,
First Amendment concerns other than those addressed by Noerr will
not complicate strict application of the antitrust laws. The next Part
explores the numerous and weighty shortcomings of that legal regime.
III. EXPRESSIVE BOYCOTTS AS PROTECTED SPEECH
Part I briefly delineated the basic tenets of the relevant First
Amendment and antitrust law and precedent. Part II described the
flawed manner the Court has developed to handle the expressive
170. Id. at 430.
171. For a critique of the First Amendment analysis in Superior Court Trial Lawyers, see
infra Part III.A.
172. E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961).
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boycotts at issue. This Part critiques the Supreme Court’s basis for
disqualifying from First Amendment protection the expressive
boycotts at issue in this Article.
A. The Scope of Protected Speech
Determining what level of protection, if any, expressive boycotts
merit requires a more expansive consideration of First Amendment
jurisprudence than those cases which explicitly address the antitrust
intersection at issue. In fact, a central shortcoming of the majority in
the Superior Court Trial Lawyers case was its failure to look beyond
the narrow perspective of this small set of cases, which arguably
skewed the framing of the legal issue.
In Superior Court Trial Lawyers, the Supreme Court constrained
itself not only by focusing solely on political speech but also by
173
narrowly defining “political.” In effect, the presence of an economic
self-interest on the part of the boycotters disqualified their expression
174
from treatment as political speech.
This manufactured
incompatibility and its consequences are generally inconsistent with
the Court’s own precedent. As this Article has discussed, Noerr
established that the mere presence, or even dominance, of a selfinterested economic motivation need not diminish one’s First
175
Amendment immunity from antitrust liability.
The Supreme Court has also recognized that political speech is
often combined with nonpolitical, oftentimes commercial, speech. In
such instances, the combined speech receives the level of protection
176
accorded to the more strongly protected speech component.
It is not clear that a professional’s speech is necessarily commercial
[and thereby receiving less First Amendment protection] whenever
173. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 427–28. The dissent recognized that
economic interest was not incompatible with the presence of protected political expression. Id.
at 449 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Unfortunately, for instant
purposes, the dissent’s recognition of a protected speech interest was inextricably linked to its
political nature. “Expressive boycotts have been a principal means of political communication
since the birth of the Republic.” Id. at 447.
174. For a discussion on the role of economic self-interest in boycotts, see supra Part II.C.
175. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139; see also Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486
U.S. 492, 499 (1988) (“Concerted efforts to restrain or monopolize trade by petitioning
government officials are protected from antitrust liability under the doctrine established by
Noerr.”).
176. See Kindred, supra note 141, at 738 (arguing that when the Supreme Court has
assessed speech that is both commercial and noncommercial, it has “consistently treated the
speech as political”).
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it relates to that person’s financial motivation for speaking. But even
assuming, without deciding, that such speech in the abstract is
indeed merely “commercial,” we do not believe that the speech
retains its commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined
177
with otherwise fully protected speech.

This ruling in Riley, addressing speech within the context of
charitable solicitations, recognized that care “must be undertaken
with due regard for the reality that [such speech] is characteristically
intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech . . . and
for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information
178
and advocacy would likely cease.”
Although instructive, charitable solicitations are not analogous
to the expressive boycotts at issue for a multitude of reasons; most
importantly, the boycotts at issue in this Article often entail activities
that are potentially illegal (under either a per se or rule of reason
analysis). The presence of a nominally per se violation poses the
greater challenge for First Amendment law. As this Article discusses,
within a conventional antitrust setting, the imposition of per se
illegality to price fixing reflects the reasonable assumptions that the
conduct may have pernicious effects and, equally important, that it
179
will not have any salutary effects. It is important to recognize that,
in a large category of cases, such as when the price fixers do not have
market power, no pernicious effect will actually occur. The presence
of automatic condemnation is not questioned, however, because no
beneficial effects are unnecessarily sacrificed. This extremely limited
inquiry also serves administrative efficiency. The propriety of this
presumed tradeoff becomes uncertain, however, when society
attaches value to the expressive function of the anticompetitive
conduct at issue.
B. Boycott as a Unique Form of Speech
This Section considers the value—perhaps even unique value—
of expressive boycotts. Expressive boycotts, in contrast to narrowly
instrumental boycotts such as that in Mandeville Island, constitute a
form of public discourse. The undertakings are public, involve issues
of social policy (in addition to possible economic gain) that transcend
177. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 795–96 (1988) (citations
omitted); see also supra note 33.
178. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
179. For a discussion of per se illegality, see supra Part I.B.
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the specific transactions at issue, and take the form of normative
180
debate. This Section explains how expressive boycotts combine two
key elements that make them effective speech: expression through
sacrifice and expression as a group.
1. Sacrifice. Marshall McLuhan’s observation that “the medium
181
is the message” takes on a particular relevance within the context of
boycotts. By their very nature, boycotts often poignantly convey the
notion of sacrifice and, as a consequence, signal an intensity of
commitment. “A boycott, like a hunger strike, conveys an emotional
message that is absent in a letter to the editor, a conversation with the
182
mayor, or even a protest march.” Moreover, when sacrifice is
involved, the ongoing nature of the boycott further underscores the
element of commitment. As one participant in the Claiborne boycott
observed, “Unlike voter registration, which was a one-time act, the
boycott relied on a daily commitment, making it fundamental to the
183
lives of most blacks.” It entailed a range of sacrifices including
“doing without spontaneous purchases (like ice cream on a hot day),
and the more fundamental problems of finding transportation and
184
securing credit.”
Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall urged a
similar assessment in their Superior Court Trial Lawyers dissent: “The
refusal of the Trial Lawyers to accept appointments by itself
communicated a powerful idea: CJA compensation rates had
deteriorated so much, relatively speaking, that the lawyers were
185
willing to forgo their livelihoods rather than return to work.” “By

180. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1802–03 (2004) (identifying
factors that render the application of the First Amendment more likely).
181. See generally MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF
MAN 23–35 (1964) (discussing the relationship between medium and message).
182. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 450 (1990) (Brennan J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183. CROSBY, supra note 134, at 130.
184. Id. at 135. “[M]ost blacks began to do the bulk of their shopping in Vicksburg (about
thirty miles away) and Jackson (about sixty miles away).” Id. at 134. For a related discussion on
additional shopping in Fayette, see supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
185. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 450 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in part and
dissented in part from the Court’s ruling. They concurred with the majority that the boycotters’
conduct was “neither clearly outside the scope of the Sherman Act nor automatically
immunized . . . by the First Amendment.” Id. at 437. The Justices dissented with regard to the
majority’s condemnation of the boycott under a per se rule. Id. Owing to this Article’s focus on
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sacrificing income that they actually desired, and thus inflicting
hardship on themselves as well as on the city, the lawyers
demonstrated the intensity of their feelings and the depth of their
186
commitment.”
What is most significant about the expressive boycotts at issue in
this Article is the interplay of sacrifice and self-interest. Typically,
boycotters’ sacrifice involves the intentional disruption of their
187
natural patterns of buying and selling. When economic self-interest
is implicated, it is usually reflected in the boycott’s objective. The
boycotters incur the losses attendant to the undertaking even though
the prospect of prevailing and, thereby, benefiting is highly uncertain.
Moreover, nonparticipating competitors of the boycotters may not
only acquire certain advantages over the boycotters during the
protest, but the nonparticipants also typically share in the benefits
should the protest be successful. Just as economic self-interest, within
other contexts, has not been deemed inconsistent with protected
speech, so, too, it is not inconsistent with sacrifice.
2. Solidarity. While in theory expressive action, such as a
nonpurchase, can be undertaken by a single individual, within the
context of boycotts it is invariably a joint effort. Both the high level of
First Amendment protection accorded to joint speech and its
underlying rationale have clear implications for joint expressive
conduct. “The Court has acknowledged the importance of freedom of
association in guaranteeing the right of people to make their voices
heard on public issues: ‘Effective advocacy of both public and private
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
188
enhanced by group association . . . .’” The basis for extending First
Amendment protections in this manner is clear: “The right to speak is
often exercised most effectively by combining one’s voice with the

the second of these two points, it refers to Brennan and Marshall’s opinion as a dissent. Justice
Blackmun agreed with Justice Brennan’s reasoning but wrote a separate statement concurring
in part and dissenting in part from the Court’s opinion. Id. at 453 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). This Article uses “the dissent” to refer to Justice Brennan’s
statement.
186. Id. at 450 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187. As discussed supra Part II.C.2, instances may arise in which one or more boycotters
may directly benefit while the effort was ongoing.
188. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) (quoting
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
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189

voice of others.” Perhaps most significant about this right of
“expressive association” is its unequivocal basis in protecting
“effective” speech rather than in legitimate but abstract notions of
190
personal autonomy. Joint advocacy contributes to speech in that
individuals may be more willing to undertake expressive actions, such
as boycotts, as part of a group for reasons unrelated to the group’s
coercive economic effect. Individuals oftentimes are induced to
participate because of “the value of the collective goal of the
movement, social prestige, feelings of solidarity, normative
expectations, or the value of the specific identity invoked by the
191
movement.” In fact, the perceived value of the boycott goal, and in
turn the cost potential supporters may be willing to incur, may
increase when the goal is shared collectively by the community from
which a prospective boycotter hails.
An individual’s self-concept derives in part from the groups to which
she belongs, and a key part of group identity may be participation in
group causes. Individuals may . . . perceive a higher gain from
punishing the firm when others are also doing so (perhaps because
they infer something about the seriousness of the firm’s behavior
192
from the choices of others).

These noneconomic values associated with participation in a group
effort are reflected in the recollections of an activist “who began
working in Claiborne County in the 1970s [and] remembered that the
boycott ‘was a part of people’s identity, what they had or hadn’t done
during that boycott. I remember that very clearly. It was an
193
identifier.’”

189. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 68 (2006); see
also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (“[T]he Court has recognized a right to
associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—
speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. The
Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of
preserving other individual liberties.”).
190. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 68.
191. Aradhana Roy, The Mobilization and Performance Consequences of Firms’
Participation in Social Movements: Firms in the Open Source Movement 78 (2008)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(citations omitted).
192. Andrew John & Jill Klein, The Boycott Puzzle: Consumer Motivations for Purchase
Sacrifice, 49 MGMT. SCI. 1196, 1204 (2003).
193. CROSBY, supra note 134, at 130.
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3. Mechanism Selection.
Boycotts are unique expressive
undertakings combining elements of sacrifice and solidarity. These
two characteristics typically lend credibility to the undertaking. One
must be sensitive to not only the message a boycott sends but also the
message a nonboycott transmits.
A useful starting point for the issue of mechanism selection is the
sundry ways the Court addressed the issue in Superior Court Trial
Lawyers. As part and parcel of the majority’s rejection of the First
Amendment’s applicability to the lawyers’ boycott, the Court
observed that the Trial Lawyers’ efforts to explain their cause and “to
lobby District officials to enact favorable legislation . . . were activities
that were fully protected by the First Amendment. But nothing in the
FTC’s order would curtail such activities, and nothing in the FTC’s
194
reasoning condemned any of those activities.” What relevance, if
any, should attach to the existence of alternative mechanisms? Should
it matter that the other means available are arguably less effective at
conveying the message, perhaps due to their relative inability to
attract press coverage, than are the contested means? All other things
being equal, a comparable message conveyed without these
characteristics—sacrifice and solidarity—will also attract less media
attention. These insights likely informed Dean Wiley Branton’s
recommendation to the Trial Lawyers that they do “something
195
dramatic to attract attention.”
It is undeniable that several constitutionally protected avenues
technically exist for the boycotters to publicize their underlying
grievance. The manner in which the Superior Court Trial Lawyers
ruling discussed the existence of those protected outlets, however,
seems somewhat reminiscent of a position that the Court had already
emphatically rejected, namely that a given “burden [on speech] is
196
permissible because other avenues of expression remain open.” The
rationale is that merely because the speakers “remain free to employ
other means to disseminate their ideas does not take their [contested]
197
speech . . . outside the bounds of First Amendment protection.” As
the Court stated previously, the First Amendment protects one’s right
not only “to advocate [one’s] cause but also to select what [one]

194.
195.
196.
197.

FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 426 (1990).
Id. at 451 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988).
Id.
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believe[s] to be the most effective means for so doing.” This last
point takes on particular practical salience when the contested
“avenues of communication” are more effective, fundamental, or
199
economical than those uncontested. Although the majority in
Superior Court Trial Lawyers treated, whether intentionally or not,
the different avenues for speech as somewhat fungible, the dissent
argued, to the contrary, that it was legally relevant that “the Trial
Lawyers enjoyed no other effective means of making themselves
200
heard.”
This Article argues that expressive boycotts are unique
expressive speech worthy of protection under First Amendment law.
To see this, compare a protest made through a joint petition against
use restrictions on licenses with a joint boycott of the same. Although
a joint petition could attract some public attention, it lacks important
features that undermine the strength of its message relative to a
group boycott. Signing a joint statement is a one-time event, whereas
a boycott is ongoing and hence more powerful. Of course, some types
of nonboycott speech could also be ongoing. The more important
difference is that boycotts involve ongoing sacrifice whereas joint
petitions involve little, if any, sacrifice. Thus, a joint petition makes a
weaker and less credible statement.
Attracting the press is often an extremely effective, and always a
legitimate, mechanism for engaging in social discourse. Consider, for
example, that media attention often enables boycotters to “broaden
201
the scope of conflict.” The sympathy of third parties can increase
the power of the boycotters relative to their target even if those third
parties do not participate in the relevant market and, therefore,
cannot contribute directly to the underlying economic impact of the
202
boycott itself. The mere fact of media coverage can serve to
“validate[]” the importance of the boycott not only to third parties
203
but also to its participants. In the most extreme cases, “[r]eceiving
standing in the media is often a necessary condition before targets of
influence will grant a [boycott] recognition and deal with its claims
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 437 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
201. William A. Gamson & Gadi Wolfsfeld, Movements and Media as Interacting Systems,
528 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 114, 116 (1993).
202. See id.
203. Id.
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204

and demands.” Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that some
participants may not be willing to accept the ongoing cost of the
boycott, in terms of sacrifice, without an external signal that their
205
message is being heard on some level. Of course, just as media
coverage can foment public discourse, it can also facilitate attracting
the critical mass of boycotters necessary to wield market power.
Finally, despite general recognition of the significance of sacrifice
within a boycott context, the equally important significance of a
nonboycott by protestors has gone unrecognized. Under many
circumstances, when protestors continue business as usual with the
target of their criticism, they may blunt (if not entirely undermine)
the force of their objections or at least how they are perceived. One’s
ability to forgo purchasing entirely reflects in part whether substitutes
are available and the extent to which the good is a necessity versus a
luxury. Boycotts are particularly important when permanently exiting
the market is not a viable option. This circumstance will most likely
arise when there are no strong substitutes or when the controversy
that prompted individuals to forgo purchases would continue to
206
matter to them even if they were not making purchases.
IV. EXPRESSIVE BOYCOTTS INVOLVING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Part III highlights the role of expressive boycotts in society’s
ongoing and varied civil rights discourse. This Part introduces a very
different series of contemporary boycotts characterized by the
centrality of social debate regarding intellectual property. It is quite
possible that such undertakings will become even more prevalent in
the future and, therefore, will continue to raise the issues that this
Article seeks to address. The discourse generated by the boycotts
introduced in this Part transcends the transactions nominally involved
and reflects a desire to engage in public discussion on broader issues
including the relationship between patents and scientific progress,
humanitarian limits on for-profit pricing of medicines, and the
relationship between intellectual property (both patents and
207
copyrights) and information sharing in academic environments.
204. Id.
205. For a description of the effects that media coverage can have on increasing
participation by signaling the likelihood of success, see Roy, supra note 191, at 80.
206. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 14, at 100.
207. For ease of exposition, this Article characterizes the anecdotes as boycotts rather than
as alleged or possible boycotts. The available information does not permit establishing
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Dissatisfaction over pricing issues typically animates these
boycotts. As discussed previously, antitrust generally adopts a zerotolerance policy of per se illegality when manipulation of market
208
pricing is involved. This same general policy applies to efforts to
influence intellectual property pricing. The price levels, condemned
by the boycotters as exorbitant, may reflect the intellectual property
owner’s market power emanating from, for example, a merger among
intellectual property owners or a patent. The ultimate value and
subsequent pricing of that patent, or of goods that embody or
otherwise depend upon the patent, reflect market forces. More
specifically, the pricing will reflect the extent to which, if at all, the
patent right conveys market power, which, in turn, depends upon the
209
presence or absence of reasonable substitutes. Antitrust permits
even supracompetitive pricing if it results from lawfully acquired
210
market power. Market power stemming from the exclusive use
rights granted to an inventor via a patent is also accepted as lawful.
This exclusivity is viewed as creating innovation incentives.
A. Oncomouse
The “mouse genetics community” is a “tight-knit group of
211
researchers who use[] mouse models to study illness.” DuPont held
an exclusive license for the patent covering the Oncomouse, a
genetically engineered mouse that quickly became extremely valuable
to this community. DuPont’s licensing terms can be divided into three
general categories: the price of the mice themselves, the restrictions
on sharing among researchers, and the control that DuPont exerted
over downstream inventions. DuPont, who is not alone in such
licensing practices, imposed what were widely viewed by the mouse

definitively that all four examples involved boycotts, though, even for those protests for which
the least information is available, a good case can be made that a boycott was undertaken.
208. See supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text.
209. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.2 (1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
0558.pdf.
210. Market power may be lawfully acquired and maintained through, for example,
“growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). In such instances, “[t]he
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
211. Fiona Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared: Resistance & Accommodation to Patenting
in Academic Science, 115 AM. J. SOC. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 1), available at
http://fmurray.scripts.mit.edu/docs/THE_ONCOMOUSE_THAT_ROARED_FINAL.pdf.
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genetics community as excessively onerous and restrictive conditions
212
for access to this vital technology.
DuPont’s mouse-breeding arm, GenPharm, announced prices of
“$80–150 per [Onco]mouse—as much as 10 times the price charged
213
by nonprofit mouse breeders such as the Jackson Laboratories.” In
addition, GenPharm required researchers to purchase each mouse
although researchers traditionally breed additional mice without
214
further charges. “That can quickly amount to thousands of dollars
per lab—a lot of money for a resource that researchers are used to
215
getting for free.”
In addition to the cost of the mice, DuPont imposed additional
restrictions on scientists using Oncomice: scientists were no longer
able to “follow their traditional practices of sharing mice,” DuPont
exercised a form of “[c]ontractual control of scientific disclosure”
including “annual disclosure requirements,” and DuPont required
assignment of “[r]each through rights on future discoveries made with
216
an Oncomouse.” Regarding the restrictions placed upon the sharing
of mice, one scientist observed, “[i]t was an enormous obstacle to free
and open distribution of information and materials . . . . [I]t was a
whole new way of doing science . . . [and] it really affected the way
217
the mouse research community works.”
“The grumbling reached insurrection proportions after a meeting
at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory . . . when some 300 researchers
stayed for an unscheduled afternoon session on GenPharm’s pricing

212. Id. Neither DuPont’s licensing restrictions nor the subsequent reaction of the scientist
consumers were unique to either the Oncomouse research tool or DuPont more generally.
Another example of restrictions on the use of research tools resisted by the research community
is Invitrogen’s “Gateway” technology, which allows researchers to “build ORF, promoter, and
other clone sets for archiving and future access.” Invitrogen, Gateway Open Architecture
Policy, http://www.invitrogen.com/site/us/en/home/Products-and-Services/Applications/Cloning/
Gateway-Cloning/GatewayC-Misc/Additional-Info-Inquiries.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2010). In
2003, four years after the initial launch of its Gateway technology, Invitrogen changed its use
restriction policy to an open access policy, noting that “our policies were too restrictive, and
instead of enabling your research with advanced technology, we were impeding it with our
interest in protecting intellectual property.” Id.
213. Christopher Anderson, Researchers Win Decision on Knockout Mouse Pricing, 260
SCIENCE 23, 23 (1993).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Murray, supra note 211 (manuscript at 25).
217. Id. (manuscript at 26) (quoting Sam Jaffe, Ongoing Battle over Transgenic Mice,
SCIENTIST, July 19, 2004, at 46, 46).

GREENE IN FINAL

2/10/2010 9:09:32 PM

1078

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1037

218

policy . . . .” Many of the scientists were troubled not only by the
transaction costs but also by the “normative costs” associated with
219
DuPont’s licensing terms. “Scientists resorted to civil disobedience.
They chose to flaunt the law ‘and simply breed their own Oncomice,
220
effectively boycotting the company.’” Some faculty openly resisted
DuPont’s restrictions, continuing their research without adhering to
them, whereas other researchers, rather than complying with
DuPont’s demands or “liv[ing] with a cloud of fear,” turned to
221
different projects not requiring the use of Oncomice.
Assuming arguendo the existence of an Oncomouse boycott,
certain features of this matter warrant particular attention.
Conventional boycotts threaten that the participants will not purchase
the target’s product unless it modifies some or all of the conditions at
issue. The Oncomouse boycott is unconventional to the extent that
the boycotters, because of their infringement, were not deprived of
the “boycotted” product. Instead, their “sacrifice” appears to be their
exposure to potential infringement lawsuits. Presumably, the
boycotters would be willing to buy from DuPont rather than infringe
if DuPont were to alter its purchase conditions. In addition, it seems
likely that the facts would support the boycott as bona fide speech,
given the relatively public nature of the boycott and the objections of
the conspirators to licensing conditions contrary to the mouse
community’s norms for breeding mice and sharing information.
This Oncomouse case was at least partially resolved through
National Institutes of Health (NIH) intervention. Disagreement
regarding the interpretation of the NIH-brokered deal, however, led
222
to renewed tension between DuPont and a number of universities.
Absent the deal, DuPont could have brought Oncomouse lawsuits

218. Anderson, supra note 213, at 23.
219. Murray, supra note 211 (manuscript at 27).
220. Id. (citations omitted).
221. Id. (manuscript at 29).
222. Over time, as university researchers have become more involved with for-profit
entities and as universities have begun to exploit their patents as revenue sources, the
distinctions between university research and for-profit research have lessened. Id. (manuscript
at 1–2). As was observed within the context of a scientist boycott (regarding licensing terms) of
a different DuPont research tool: “DuPont is not the lone black hat on this issue. Universities,
themselves, are also asking for reach-through provisions for technology they’re exporting to
other institutions and companies, and those provisions are not unlike the demands DuPont is
making for Cre-lox.” Naomi Freundlich, Cre-lox Controversy Divides Institutions, Prompts NIH
Panel, SIGNALS, June 12, 1998, http://signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf/657b06742b5748e88825657
0005cba01/a91504e7700ed9b0882566210046c958?OpenDocument.
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claiming infringement and, perhaps, an illegal boycott. This Article
seeks to ensure that First Amendment values are respected when
legal action in response to expressive boycotts takes the form of an
223
antitrust suit.
It is noteworthy that DuPont has pursued increasingly
“aggressive licensing demands on academic and research institutions”
224
regarding the Oncomouse. In 2003, almost the entire University of
California system rejected a license with DuPont regarding
“genetically engineered mice,” owing to the university system’s
225
dissatisfaction with DuPont’s restrictive licensing terms. “The state
university’s Davis campus did, however, agree to the company’s
licensing requirements after one of its researchers bred genetically
engineered mice without DuPont permission and received a warning
226
letter . . . .” Academics and universities, to the extent that they
considered themselves somewhat removed from the threat of legal
action, are quickly being disabused of any notion that for-profit
entities like DuPont will not pursue them legally.
B. Cre-lox
DuPont also controls access to the research tool Cre-lox, which
allows researchers to “knock out” a specific gene in the DNA of a
mouse, thereby enhancing researchers’ ability to determine “gene
227
function—the holy grail of genomics.”
Despite having no
commercial value, Cre-lox has the potential to unlock a stream of

223. It is also important, particularly in the absence of the proposed changes in the law, to
educate potential boycotters regarding their exposure under the antitrust laws. For example, an
economist opining on the agbiotech industry has advocated a “joint boycott of research
agreements [by the ‘public research sector’] with any firm with which there had been prior
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and
conditions, and the efforts had been unsuccessful within a reasonable period of time” with
“significant coordination and organization” because “[m]oral suasion . . . is unlikely to be
sufficient in itself.” William Lesser, “Holding Up” the Public Agbiotech Research Sector over
Component Technologies, in TRANSITIONS IN AGBIOTECH: ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY AND
POLICY 601, 613–14 (William Lesser ed., 2000), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/
bitstream/26024/1/n1659932.pdf.
224. See Sasha Blaug et al., Managing Innovation: University-Industry Partnerships and the
Licensing of the Harvard Mouse, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 761, 761 (2004).
225. Brian Dakss, Is Commerce Blocking Science?, CBS NEWS, Nov. 1, 2003, http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/01/tech/main581313.shtml.
226. Id. (quoting Larry Fox, Chief Patent Counsel, University of California, Davis).
227. Freundlich, supra note 222.
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228

commercially valuable innovations. In the mid-1990s, DuPont
imposed stringent restrictions on the users of Cre-lox mice including
limitations on the use and sharing of Cre-lox materials. DuPont also
229
demanded rights over innovations developed using the Cre-lox tool.
As with the Oncomouse, the scientific community expressed concerns
that DuPont’s “restrictive terms could ‘seriously impede further basic
research and thwart development of future technologies that will
230
benefit the public.’”
Although dozens of universities signed agreements with DuPont,
the University of California and several other institutions refused to
231
do so. This ostensibly uneven refusal to deal caused “resentment
among universities: One university licensing officer who asked to
remain anonymous says the universities who’ve refused to sign the
Cre-lox license are furious at the signatories for ‘breaking ranks’ over
232
this issue.” Ultimately, the Cre-lox protest was resolved after
Harold Varmus, a leading researcher in this community who had
since become Director of NIH, brokered a compromise with
233
DuPont. Varmus played a similar role in mediating the Oncomouse
234
dispute.
Assuming arguendo the existence of boycotts, the Cre-lox
dispute differs along a significant dimension from the Oncomouse
dispute. The Cre-lox boycotters were concerned solely about use
restrictions, whereas the Oncomouse boycotters protested both
pricing and nonpricing issues. This distinction is critical to antitrust
analysis because boycotts directed toward pricing are reviewed under
a per se standard, whereas nonprice boycotts are reviewed under the
more lenient rule of reason standard which requires a negative
competitive effect to establish antitrust liability. The traditional
significance of this distinction would be somewhat muted within this

228. See id. (“Cre-lox will likely be no more an element of any eventual products or
businesses that emerge from the elucidation of those functions than a hammer is a part of the
eventual table it helps build.”).
229. DuPont and NIH Reach Agreement over Genetic Mice, PROF. ETHICS REP., Summer
1998, at 3, available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/sfrl/per/per14.htm.
230. Marshall, supra note 12, at 257 (quoting a letter from NIH Director Varmus to DuPont
regarding his refusal to sign an agreement regarding the Cre-lox mouse).
231. Meredith Wadman, DuPont Opens Up Access to Genetics Tool, 394 NATURE 819, 819
(1998).
232. Id.
233. Marshall, supra note 12, at 257.
234. Id.
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context, however, if a target’s capitulations to boycotters’ demands
235
constituted evidence of competitive effect.
C. Academic Periodicals
In recent years, many professors and librarians have grown
increasingly dissatisfied with the escalating price of academic journals
and its adverse effect on scholarly exchange. One pivotal moment in
this ongoing debate occurred when Professors Peter Walter and Keith
236
Yamamoto published an open letter advocating a boycott.
Cell Press is breaking an unwritten contract with the scientific
community: being a publisher of our research carries the
responsibility to make our contributions publicly available at
reasonable rates. As an academic community, it is time that we
reassert our values. We can all think of better ways to spend our
time than providing free services to support a publisher that values
profit above its academic mission. . . . Our goal is to effect change,
237
but to be effective we must stand together.

To “effect change,” Walter and Yamamoto advocated that scholars
boycott providing important services to Cell Press (reviewing
manuscripts, serving on editorial boards, or submitting papers) and
that they widely communicate the “pricing tactics and business
238
strategies” of Cell Press’s publisher, Elsevier. This should continue,
according to Walter and Yamamoto, until “the University of
California [the two authors’ academic institution] and other
239
institutions are granted electronic access to Cell Press journals.”
In many regards, this letter echoed a prior and less targeted call
to boycott made by a Public Library of Science (PLoS) initiative
urging researchers to boycott publication in all scientific journals that
did not “grant unrestricted free distribution rights to
240
[research] . . . within 6 months of their initial publication date.”
PLoS’s petition attracted a large number of signatories, though,
235. For distinguishing concessions based on coercion versus persuasion, see infra Part
V.A.3.
236. See generally Jeanne Lenzer, Scientists Call for a Boycott of Cell Press, 327 BRI. MED.
J. 1070 (2003), available at http://bmj.com/cgi/content/full/327/7423/1070-b (“The boycott, says
Professor Walter, is ‘resonating incredibly well.’”).
237. Open Letter, supra note 10.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Open Letter from Pub. Library of Sci. to scientific publishers (undated), available at
http://www.plos.org/about/letter.html.
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ultimately, PLoS’s primary impact came through its activity as a
241
nonprofit scientific and medical online publishing venture. The
intertwining of efforts to boycott a for-profit publication and to
support comparable publications offered through learned societies or
242
universities at substantially lower prices has arisen in other forms.
The following example involving the Journal of Algorithms illustrates
one particular trend:
For several years we and many of our colleagues have become more
and more concerned about the fact that libraries are increasingly
unable to afford the prices being charged by commercial publishers
of scientific journals. . . . [In the face of such concerns,] the entire
editorial board ultimately decided to resign from the Journal of
Algorithms in favor of launching a new journal to be called ACM
243
Transactions on Algorithms . . . .

University librarians are another group of key participants in the
phenomenon of boycotting academic publishers. Perhaps not
surprisingly, law school librarians have most openly acknowledged
the antitrust implications of these boycotts. The American
Association of Law Libraries’ (AALL) website includes “How does
antitrust affect AALL’s activities?” among its listing of frequently

241. Assessing these undertakings raises interesting issues regarding proof of conspiracy.
Although it is true that the petitions associated with the PLoS boycott attracted thousands of
faculty members as signatories, are they coconspirators for antitrust purposes? In the absence of
an actual agreement (which one could argue the petition represents), key characteristics for
discerning the existence of an antitrust conspiracy include whether mechanisms exist for the
monitoring of compliance with the alleged agreement and for the disciplining of those who
violate the agreement. By its very nature, compliance by signatories to a petition announcing
the rejection of certain publishing outlets is readily monitored. One of the more interesting
circumstances arising from the PLoS petition involved an article in The Physiologist specifically
identifying a high-profile petition signatory, Dr. Patrick Brown, who, according to the article’s
author, had published in a journal being boycotted. Margaret Reich, Peace, Love, and PLoS, 46
PHYSIOLOGIST 137 (2003), available at http://the-aps.org/news/PLoS.pdf. The Physiologist
subsequently published a retraction and apology after it discovered that Brown’s article had
been published while the petition was circulating “but prior to the implementation date for
action.” Clarification, 46 PHYSIOLOGIST 262, 262 (2003), available at http://www.the-aps.org/
publications/tphys/images/tphys10x03.pdf.
242. See generally Letter from Donald Knuth, Co-Editor, Journal of Algorithms, to
Editorial Bd., Journal of Algorithms (Oct. 25, 2003), available at http://www-cs-faculty.stanford.
edu/~knuth/joalet.pdf (delineating options other than publication through for-profit publishers).
243. Memorandum from Donald E. Knuth, David S. Johnson & Zvi Galil, former CoEditors, Journal of Algorithms, on changes at the Journal of Algorithms (undated), available at
http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~hal/s.pdf.
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244

asked questions. AALL notes that “[s]ome decisions, which may
have had the appearance of being based on concern about vendor
reaction, have in fact been made on the basis of advice from AALL’s
245
legal counsel.” AALL cites legal concerns about “primarily the
Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibits collective action in restraint of
trade” and concurrently acknowledges that “this concern for antitrust
may seem ironic and frustrating in the face of the shrinking
246
competition among legal information vendors [owing to mergers].”
Nonetheless, the AALL concludes that “[its] leadership feels that
simply ignoring AALL legal counsel’s advice would be irresponsible
247
and would violate their fiduciary duties to the AALL membership.”
In an e-mail to the AALL membership, AALL President Ann
248
Fessenden delineated the organization’s antitrust policy and noted
that “legal counsel has expressed considerable concern
249
about . . . boycotting, refusing to sign contracts etc.”
More
specifically, Fessenden stated that, “[t]wo decisions which have been
based on this [legal] advice included cancellation of an SCCLL-SIS
program on legal publishing (program description included ‘boycotts’
as a possible member response to price increases) and some changes
250
that were made in [another program].”
244. Am. Ass’n of Law Libraries, Vendor Relations FAQ, http://www.aallnet.org/vendor
relations/faq.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
245. Id.
246. Id.; see also Mary M. Case, Information Access Alliance: Challenging Anticompetitive
Behavior in Academic Publishing, COLLEGE & RES. LIBRARIES NEWS, June 2004,
http://www.ala.org/ala/mgrps/divs/acrl/publications/crlnews/2004/jun/iaa.cfm (delineating the
“general global trend” of mergers within scholarly publishing).
247. Am. Ass’n of Law Libraries, supra note 244.
248. The policy, posted online, reads in part: “AALL cannot sanction programming,
publications, or other communications that may provide the basis for an inference that members
agreed to take any action relating to prices, services, production, allocation of markets, boycotts,
refusals to deal, or any other matter having a market effect. AALL is responsible for statements
made by speakers at our programs and in articles in our publications.” Id.
249. Posting of Ann Fessenden, AALL President, ann_fessenden@ca8.uscourts.gov, to
lawlibdir@lists.washlaw.edu (Nov. 5, 2007) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
250. Id. Kendall F. Svengalis, the speaker whose presentation was cancelled, has written
that in conversation with lawyers from the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division [DOJ] he
learned that DOJ “would only get involved if some sort of concerted organizational action, such
as a boycott, was being organized.” DOJ’s attorney specifically referenced the “travel agent
boycott of airlines, etc. back in the 1980s.” Posting of Kendall F. Svengalis, President, Rhode
Island Law Press and Adjunct Professor, University of Rhode Island, to Owner-LawLib@ucdavis.edu (Aug. 27, 2007), available at http://listproc.ucdavis.edu/archives/law-lib/law-lib.
log0708/0267.html. Throughout the 1980s a number of antitrust proceedings were undertaken
involving the travel industry generally and travel agents in particular. The DOJ attorney
appears to have referenced the slightly later proceeding (early 1990s) of United States v.
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Concern that discussions about publisher policies including
pricing may raise antitrust issues emanates not only from the
leadership of organizations such as the AALL but also from
individual participants on relevant listservs. Peter Banks, Acting Vice
President for Publications at the nonprofit American Diabetes
Organization, wrote: “I am not trying to inhibit discussion by
251
librarians, publishers, or dog catchers, for that matter.” He then
observed that, “any discussion of pricing issues on list serves is
generally recognized as potentially anticompetitive and prohibited by
252
most moderators.”
D. Norvir
In December 2003, Abbott Laboratories announced a 400
percent price increase on Norvir (ritonavir), which is used as a
253
booster drug for other retrovirals used to treat AIDS. Strong and
vocal opposition to this price increase among doctors and other
healthcare providers treating persons with HIV culminated in a
254
boycott against Abbott. In January 2004, eighty HIV healthcare
providers sent a letter representing a “collective unified agreement
from all the signatories” regarding their actions “until the ritonavir
255
price is undone.” The letter stated that the signatories “strongly
believe in the importance of a profitable and healthy pharmaceutical
industry market that will stimulate pharmaceutical R&D. . . . [and f]or
that reason, we would be in favor of your company, and other HIV

Association of Retail Travel Agents, Civ. No. 94-2305 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 24, 1994, entered March
16, 1995), which was settled without trial. Most importantly, for instant purposes, the point of
comparison cited by DOJ was a boycott that was strictly economic and involved no expressive
component.
251. Posting of Peter Banks, Acting Vice President, American Diabetes Organization,
pbanks@diabetes.org, to liblicense-l@lists.yale.edu (Nov. 11, 2005), available at http://www.
library.yale.edu/~llicense/ListArchives/0511/msg00094.html.
252. Id. Banks also cites the following language, which is often included in listserv rules:
“Messages should not be posted if they encourage or facilitate members to arrive at any
agreement that either expressly or implicitly leads to price fixing, [or] a boycott of another’s
business . . . .” Id. (citing language from the National Association of Independent Schools).
253. Keith Alcorn, Doctors Rebellion Against Ritonavir Price Increase Spreads in U.S.,
AIDSMAP NEWS, Feb. 11, 2004, http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/1B319D33-5F3E-4DFA-A3
DD-0713A64FF0C2.asp.
254. Id.
255. Letter from HIV healthcare providers to Dr. John Leonard, Vice President, Global
Pharm. Dev., Abbott Labs. (Jan. 20, 2004), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/aids/
docs-abbott01202004.html.
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committed companies, increasing their revenues.” Yet they rejected
the justifications Abbott had offered for this price increase and,
instead, stated their belief that Abbott’s strategy constitutes “taking
257
advantage of a monopolistic situation.” The signatories argued that,
“[a]s gatekeepers, who have been told for the last 20 years that we are
responsible for keeping medical costs down, we cannot allow this to
258
happen.”
Until Norvir’s price was lowered, the signatories agreed, among
other things, to “formally join[] a nationwide boycott” and to take the
following actions: resign from Abbott advisory boards, stop
participating in Abbott promotional events or in Abbott-sponsored
clinical trials, prescribe non-Abbott drugs when alternatives would
not affect patient care, and actively encourage other physicians and
259
organizations to join in these actions. In February 2004, leading
doctors at the Eleventh Conference on Retroviruses and
Opportunistic Infections announced that the boycott “is now
supported by more than 200 leading HIV prescribers in the United
260
States.” One observer commented that this boycott “could signal a
new brand of militancy among doctors who have been loath to use
tools of protest more commonly associated with political and social
261
activists.” Accordingly, if the boycott proved to be an “effective
mechanism,” there would have been reason to “suspect there’s going
to be a move of many more physicians across the country to use this
262
kind of mechanism to attempt to control drug prices.”
The Norvir case, like the academic periodicals example, presents
a situation in which the boycotters’ effort and influence are not
restricted to forgoing purchases (writing prescriptions) but extend to
withholding services from the target firm (supervision of clinical
trials). Many intellectual property settings involve complex buyer and
seller relationships in which each party operates, at some level, in
both roles. Significantly, boycotters’ market power may vary with
their role.

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Alcorn, supra note 253.
261. Stephen Smith, AIDS Drug’s High Cost Spurs Doctors’ Boycott, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
19, 2004, at A1.
262. Id. (quoting Kenneth Kaitin, Dir., Tufts Univ. Ctr. for the Study of Drug Dev.).
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***
The activities that this Article discusses represent, on one level,
the best of society: the efforts of researchers seeking to cure cancer,
doctors treating persons with AIDS, and academics and librarians
facilitating access to research journals. Each group arguably
undertook, in differing ways and to varying degrees, an expressive
boycott to promote their respective goals. To those schooled in
antitrust, however, the collective actions of these boycotters also
constitute potential violations of the law. Although the wisdom of
these or comparable boycotts along any number of political, social, or
economic dimensions may be debated, neither the existence nor the
content of these debates meaningfully bears upon the antitrust
implications of the boycotts, with the possible exception of a narrow
economic inquiry.
V. OVERCOMING ANTITRUST OBSTRUCTION
TO EXPRESSIVE BOYCOTTS
Part III argued that expressive boycotts combining political and
economic dimensions should constitute protected speech. The
judiciary’s failure to accord any First Amendment value to such
speech is largely attributable to the interaction of an excessively
categorical approach to identifying speech interests and an economic
efficiency–based approach to antitrust law that is also unduly narrow
given the presence of constitutional considerations. This Part
advocates changes to the current application of antitrust law to
expressive boycotts that honor the First Amendment values at stake
and relate them to other important values regarding competition. Part
V relies upon the boycotts related to intellectual property described
in Part IV as a useful point of reference.
The Supreme Court has called the Sherman Antitrust Act “a
charter of freedom” not only because of the importance of the values
it seeks to protect but also because it has a “generality and
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in
263
constitutional provisions.” In recent decades that flexibility has
been directed primarily toward accommodating economics-related
developments. The recommendations, in contrast, require antitrust to
demonstrate greater openness with regard to noneconomic
considerations.
263.

Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936).
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Under this Article’s proposal, courts would engage in more
nuanced determinations regarding the existence of protected speech
interests and, when speech interests are present, apply a modified
antitrust analysis. The underlying determinations—both factual and
legal—may be challenging, particularly in cases of first impression. If,
however, the courts do not unduly restrict their use of general First
Amendment precedent, they will find that considerable guidance is
already available and that the adversarial process will produce
insights on how to apply that precedent. This Article’s proposal
avoids direct balancing, which is tremendously difficult to implement
given the ultimate incommensurability of the values underlying the
First Amendment (speech) and antitrust (economic efficiency). In
addition to avoiding the direct balancing thicket, this Article’s
proposal would provide the necessary increased protection for speech
interests. After presenting its recommendations, this Part discusses
the most obvious alternative not proposed: the outright immunization
of expressive boycotts.
A. Recommendations
This Article proposes extending limited First Amendment
protection to expressive boycotts, including those not directed toward
the government, in which the boycotters’ speech and economic selfinterest are intertwined. When an arguably expressive boycott is at
issue, the legal analysis addresses three classes of questions. First,
does a bona fide speech interest exist? If such a speech interest is not
present, then the boycott receives conventional antitrust analysis.
Second, is there a conspiracy? Third, is there a competitive harm and,
if so, what is the likely source of that harm? If such a speech interest
is present, it operates as a kind of affirmative defense and influences
the course of the ensuing antitrust analysis, which would deviate from
264
more conventional applications. The boycotters’ noneconomic as
well as economic interests must be considered; therefore, the
threshold antitrust inquiry regarding the presence of a conspiracy
becomes more complex. This more nuanced treatment of the interests
at stake necessitates, in turn, a revised competitive effects analysis

264. See Deborah A. Garza, DOJ’s New Export-Promotion Policy: Using the Sherman Act
to Remedy the Exclusion of U.S. Firms from Foreign Markets, ANTITRUST, Fall 1994, at 28, 29
(characterizing Noerr immunity as an antitrust defense); Joe Sims & Edith E. Scott, Antitrust
Consequences to Private Parties of Participation in and Settlement of Selected Trade Actions, 56
ANTITRUST L.J. 561, 588 (1987) (same).
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and the elimination of per se condemnation. This proposal would
subject expressive boycotts, such as the three examples of intellectual
property boycotts which directly implicated pricing—Oncomouse,
Norvir, and academic journals—to rule of reason analysis. Moreover,
the same values that necessitate the application of the rule of reason
also require modification of the rule. The substance of these
recommendations can be implemented in different ways and to
different extents by the key actors: the courts, the antitrust agencies,
and Congress. These recommendations constitute a starting point
from which First Amendment values can gain greater recognition
within the context of antitrust assessments of expressive boycotts and,
perhaps, within antitrust analysis more generally.
1. Speech Interest. Under this Article’s proposal, the first step is
to determine whether the boycotters have a bona fide speech interest
at stake. The facts instructive on this point could take any number of
forms. This Section distinguishes boycott characteristics that are
strongly indicative of a bona fide speech interest from those that
strongly militate against such a finding.
Although expressive boycotts defy easy categorization within the
First Amendment scheme, that framework provides some useful
points of reference. For example, expressive boycotts are often
supported by a wide range of speech activities that share important
features with charitable solicitations and provide evidence regarding
whether the boycott is expressive or purely coercive. Opining on the
topic of charitable solicitations, the Supreme Court has recognized
that they “involve a variety of speech interests—communication of
information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas,
and the advocacy of causes—that are within the protection of the
265
First Amendment.”
The presence of a significant effort at public discourse, whether
directed primarily to a specific community (for example, scientists) or
to the public at large, is paramount to demonstrating a speech
266
interest. Thus, demonstrating that boycotters made efforts to

265. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
266. As discussed in Part I.A, campaigns directed at the government may constitute
petitioning and, therefore, receive immunity under Noerr. An important caveat to Noerr
protection, however, is that it does not extend to all concerted efforts to influence the
government. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 425 (1990) (citing Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. 486 U.S. 492, 503 (1988)). The Supreme Court has
rejected, for example, that competitors advocating specific governmental rates or price supports
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publicly disseminate information about the boycott would be critical
to establishing a cognizable speech interest. Press releases, petitions,
and the like could provide this type of evidence. Conversely, efforts
to maintain secrecy, which typify traditional antitrust conspiracies,
would undermine finding an expressive purpose. Moreover, those
involved in conventional conspiracies are unlikely, given the nature of
their motives, to invite public scrutiny. In addition to the considerable
legal vulnerability of participants in conventional boycotts, their
profile as not particularly sympathetic defendants might also
embolden boycott targets to file suit.
Examining the nature of the dialogue could provide further
evidence of the importance of public discourse to the boycott. Does
the boycott seek to address longstanding or broader social issues? For
example, the Oncomouse and Cre-lox boycotts, in many regards,
naturally grew out of the preexisting open science movement, which
267
seeks to promote a freer exchange of information. Preboycott
activity supporting similar goals as well as contemporaneous framing
of the actual boycott in these broader terms further suggests the
268
presence of a bona fide expressive purpose.
Another factor to consider is the significance or triviality of the
boycotters’ economic interest. The Court’s ruling fails to address the
practical matter of what level of economic self-interest is sufficient to
269
bar a First Amendment–based defense. Conversely, what quantum
can commit horizontal price fixing. See id. FTC Commissioner William Kovacic posits that
“[h]ad the containment of the per se rule been breached” in Superior Court Trial Lawyers,
government contractors might have “felt emboldened to act together” and undertake boycotts
that would then be justified as “political speech necessary to draw attention to threats to the
public’s wellbeing.” William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Stories, 4 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 241, 260
(2008) (reviewing ANTITRUST STORIES, supra note 142). Kovacic observes that it is “uncertain”
whether such boycotters would have been successful in “pulling themselves within the
protection from per se condemnation that a defendants’ victory in [Superior Court Trial
Lawyers] might have provided.” Id. This Article addresses expressive boycotts that are directed
toward the policies of private parties rather than the government. As such, Noerr is unlikely to
be implicated. With that said, however, those engaging in expressive boycotts directed toward
the government would be able to argue why they deserve the limited First Amendment
protection this Article advocates.
267. See, e.g., Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 79 (1999) (providing “a comprehensive analysis of
how law-and-norms theory applies to basic scientific research” given the increasing prevalence
and relevance of patents in university settings).
268. See, e.g., Hurwitz, supra note 49, at 116; see also supra note 180 and accompanying text.
269. Arguably, the Court’s failure to address this issue stemmed in part from the fact that
the case at issue seemed relatively straightforward on this score. The boycotters sought a wage
increase that would largely redound to their own direct benefit. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
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of economic self-interest is necessary to interpose an antitrust
challenge? Consider, for example, this Article’s discussion of the
medical doctors’ boycott of Abbott. The doctors themselves did not
directly purchase Norvir. They prescribed it to their patients who
then purchased the drug with or without benefit of insurance. Yet
there are arguments regarding the doctor-patient relationship and the
possibility that necessary doctor visits for drug administration or for
follow-up care created an economic interest on the part of the
doctors. This example illustrates some of the complexities associated
with assessing boycotters’ economic interest.
When a significant number of boycott participants or supporters
have little or no economic interest in the outcome of the boycott, the
presence of a speech interest becomes especially likely. In some
regards, this argument harkens back to the Supreme Court’s illconceived bifurcation of political and economically motivated speech.
One consequence of the Court’s creation and application of this
division is that, if one is not economically motivated, then any other
motivation is deemed political in some sense—or at least worthy of
270
First Amendment protection. This Article rejects, as the Supreme
271
Court has in other cases and contexts, the argument that having an
economic interest is incompatible with having a cognizable speech
interest worthy of First Amendment protection. Nonetheless, this
Article recognizes that considering whether expressive boycotts
appeal to those without economic interests can be instructive. When
boycotts garner noneconomic supporters, they must involve some
noneconomic appeal. Such appeal, in turn becomes some evidence of
political speech. One virtue of this inquiry is that it makes possible
direct assessment of efforts to communicate with third parties (those
without direct economic interests) as well as any support offered by
third parties.

Ass’n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Moreover, it was of a sufficient magnitude
such that not only did the protesters abandon their boycott but the number of attorneys seeking
this work also increased substantially. See id. at 238 n.18 (noting that 100 to 200, rather than 40
to 60, attorneys call in for cases on a daily basis since the rate increase). Given the range of
values at stake in expressive boycotts, lower courts would do well to construe only direct and
substantial economic interests as giving rise to the presumption against any First Amendment
defense.
270. The dissent recognized that economic interest was not incompatible with the presence
of protected political expression. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 449 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This Article proposes a more expansive definition
of protected speech that extends beyond political speech. See supra Part II.C.2.
271. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
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The manner in which boycotters participate in the effort might
also illuminate the role of noneconomic interests. “Boycotts, like
other instances of collective action, are subject to . . . free-rider
272
problems that limit the incentive for participation.” If a boycott
involves large numbers of participants, it is unlikely that those joining
last are motivated primarily by economic self-interest and, hence, that
the boycott itself is solely economic in nature. For example, consider
the incentives of a prospective boycott participant, assuming that the
prospective participant would bear the same costs and reap the same
potential benefits as existing participants. As the number of existing
boycotters increases, the economic incentive for additional
individuals to participate decreases and eventually becomes quite
273
small. Joining the boycott would entail the same sacrifice that
existing participants experience and would have a negligible effect on
the outcome if there are already a large number of participants.
Furthermore, because the benefits of a successful boycott would
extend to nonparticipants, free-riding rather than participation makes
economic sense. Though the evidence may be difficult to acquire and
interpret, the participation trajectory characterizing a boycott may
274
illuminate its expressive purpose.
2. Conspiracy. The presence of a bona fide speech interest
increases the complexity of the preliminary, but critical,
determination regarding conspiracy. In contrast to more conventional
antitrust settings, conspiracy law’s simplifying assumption of purely
economic actors may be particularly unsound for the expressive
275
boycotts at issue in this Article.

272.
273.

John & Klein, supra note 192, at 1197.
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 34, 45, 53 (1971) (“When the number of participants is large, the typical
participant will know that his own efforts will probably not make much difference to the
outcome, and that he will be affected by the meeting’s decision in much the same way no matter
how much or how little effort he puts into studying the issues.”).
274. In some circumstances, a nontrivial actual benefit (or avoidance of cost) may accrue to
a boycott member based on boycott participation regardless of the effectiveness of the boycott
on its target. For example, participants may benefit from solidarity with the other members of
the boycott. For a discussion of solidarity, see supra Part III.B.2. If such considerations are the
dominant reasons for boycott participation, participation without economic interest would not
be sufficient to establish a bona fide speech interest. Further difficult antitrust issues, beyond
the scope of this Article, are raised if boycott participation is coerced by a subgroup through
social or economic threats.
275. See supra Part I.B.1.
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How would a court analyze a situation in which there was an
appeal for a boycott and the boycott lacked a concrete “agreement”?
The Seventh Circuit considered that issue within the context of a
NOW-sponsored boycott of Missouri’s convention industry
undertaken to pressure the state to support the Equal Rights
276
Amendment. The court found that “the invitation to act, the
presence of a strong motive for concerted action, and the knowledge
that others were taking similar action are sufficient to find conspiracy
277
under the Sherman Act.” This rather straightforward application of
antitrust common law renders de minimis the conspiracy
requirement. As a practical matter, it also means that much of the
same evidence that could give rise to some claim for protected
expression (such as a public appeal to boycott) could also facilitate
finding that a conspiracy existed.
When the existence of an agreement is at issue, one particularly
important antitrust inquiry concerns whether, but for similar actions
by the alleged coconspirators, it would have been contrary to the
interest of any individual participant to undertake the action in
question. Within a conventional antitrust setting, this determination is
relatively straightforward given that self-interest is assessed in strictly
economic terms. The seminal case on this issue, Interstate Circuit, Inc.
278
v. United States, involved a film exhibitor who sent a letter to eight
of its distributors requesting compliance with the exhibitor’s
279
restrictions on certain third parties. The letter “named on its face as
addresses the eight local representatives of the distributors” so that
each distributor knew that the competing distributors were
280
considering the same proposal. Each was aware that “without
substantially unanimous action” regarding the proposal, any
individual participant would risk “substantial loss,” but with
“concerted action” there was the prospect of achieving increased
281
profits. The unanimous but technically individual responses of the
distributors were deemed to constitute an agreement and, ultimately,

276. Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1302 (8th Cir. 1980). For a
discussion of the case, see supra Part II.B.
277. Id. at 1303 (citing Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 289, 296
(1979)).
278. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
279. Id. at 216.
280. Id. at 222.
281. Id.
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their conduct was condemned under the antitrust laws. Most
important for instant purposes is the Court’s holding that “[i]t was
enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and
invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and
participated in it. Each distributor was advised that the others were
asked to participate; each knew that cooperation was essential to
283
successful operation of the plan.”
Given the expressive boycotts at issue in this Article, an alleged
conspirator may have individually refused to deal with the target as a
284
matter of principle under any circumstance. Assessing actions
against self-interest is difficult when the boycotters’ interests are more
complex than narrow economic gain. If an alleged conspirator would
have engaged in the same conduct regardless of the alleged
coconspirators’ actions, it does not mean that no conspiracy exists. It
does mean, however, that the inference of a conspiracy should not be
285
conclusive. In these boycott settings, it is also possible that peer or
social pressure might act as an inducement or enforcement
mechanism imposing costs on individuals who refuse to join the
286
boycott.
Assessment of the existence of an alleged conspiracy can occur
not only on the basis of evaluating the incentives of individual
participants but also through more comprehensively evaluating the
overall economics underlying the conspiracy. For example, “if the
hallmarks of profitable economic conspiracies” are missing, then
“greater credence [should be accorded] to assertions that the
287
boycott’s purpose is political [or noneconomic].” The “economic
282. Id. at 232.
283. Id. at 226.
284. Boycotting as a form of “protest behavior is also in itself expressive, value-based
conduct, independent of the pressure [the boycotters] impose. The boycotter affirms that under
present conditions she considers purchases from or interactions with the boycotted party to be
objectionable.” C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 189 (1989).
285. See, e.g., Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV.
659, 689 (1978) (An individual who boycotts for political reasons “may be indifferent to whether
others pursue a similar course of action” or the individual may boycott “only if he believes
others will do so the same, so that the combined protest will have some practical effect.”).
286. See, e.g., Posting of Scott Aaronson to Freedom to Tinker, http://freedom-to-tinker.
com/blog/felten/journal-algorithms-editorial-board-revolts (Feb. 9, 2004, 12:38 EST) (“A few
days ago I refused to referee for the Elsevier journal Theoretical Computer Science because of
its price-gouging, and (call it peer pressure if you want) it makes me feel better that others are
making a similar decision.”).
287. Hurwitz, supra note 49, at 115. Hurwitz aptly notes, however, that “the converse of this
reasoning does not hold true with equal force.” Id. The presence of market conditions

GREENE IN FINAL

1094

2/10/2010 9:09:32 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1037

indicia of a profitable boycott” include factors that “increase[e] the
potential gains from the boycott, assist[] in its coordination, [and]
288
reduce[] incentives to cheat.”
Within conventional antitrust cases, the conspiracy requirement
has been periodically applied in a “flexible” manner so that courts are
not unduly prevented from “reaching the competitive merits” of the
289
conduct at issue. Although this flexibility has been reflected in
courts’ increased willingness to find a conspiracy, this Article
proposes that it should also be applied to expressive boycotts to
account for the value and realities of group speech and, thereby,
properly diminish a court’s willingness to so liberally find an antitrust
290
conspiracy.
3. Competitive Harm. Just as the existence of a speech interest
should be discerned from the facts at issue rather than from
mechanical categorization, so too should competitive harm be
assessed by evaluating the facts rather than by resorting to per se
rules. Expressive boycotts should never be condemned per se.
Instead, this Article proposes that all boycotts characterized by a
bona fide speech interest, whether traditionally subject to per se
illegality or rule of reason analysis, should be analyzed under a
modified rule of reason approach establishing a competitive harm and
reflecting the unique circumstances and values at stake. An important
component of this proposal is that proof of an actual economic harm
is not sufficient for antitrust liability. There must also be evidence
that economic coercion was sufficient to cause this harm. As such,
boycotts whose efficacy derives primarily from persuasion rather than
economic coercion do not run afoul of the antitrust laws.
The rationale underlying per se condemnation of particular
conduct is that anticompetitive effects are probable and
291
procompetitive effects are extremely unlikely. Per se illegality’s
automatic condemnation cannot, by design, result in false negatives

conducive to effective collusion should not be interpreted to imply that the boycott constitutes
“unlawful economic coercion” rather than legitimate expression. Id.
288. Id. (summarizing the conditions Posner and Easterbrook associate with effective
collusion).
289. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 51, at 456.
290. Note, supra note 285, at 691 (advocating, within the political boycott context, that
“courts define conspiracy narrowly and insist that it be proven by more direct means than are
often used in antitrust prosecutions in the commercial area”).
291. See supra Part I.B.
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and is unlikely to result in true false positives (meaning the
procompetitive effects would outweigh the anticompetitive effects). If
antitrust law is to account for the social benefit of the speech
involved, something more akin to a rule of reason analysis becomes
292
necessary. Without more nuanced inquiry than per se analysis
provides, antitrust law would condemn expressive boycotts that
contribute to public discourse but do not inflict competitive harm.
Valuing speech in a manner consistent with the Constitution
increases the possibility of false positives within this context, and this
possibility should be avoided. Of course, in the absence of a per se
rule, false negatives are possible. Two factors, however, militate
against the latter prospect being unduly concerning. First, this Article
advocates a modified rule of reason treatment for expressive boycotts
293
as opposed to per se legality. As such, antitrust scrutiny will be
brought to bear and anticompetitive restraints will be condemned.
Second, on the margin, allowing anticompetitive conduct with an
intertwined speech interest to persist reflects a social value judgment
regarding the respective weights of society’s interests in eliminating
anticompetitive conduct and protecting free speech.
The existence of a speech interest would not only affect per se
actions but would also necessitate modifying the rule of reason.
Changes to the rule of reason should include reforming the way that
competitive harm is identified and crafting a safety zone. As this
Article has discussed, anticompetitive effects can be established
directly through evidence of actual harm or indirectly through market
294
power. In a traditional antitrust setting, a target’s price reduction in
reponse to boycott demands constitutes the most obvious evidence of
actual harm. Under the conventional rule of reason analysis, this price
change would typically constitute prima facie evidence establishing
competitive harm. In such a case, if the effect on the market (such as

292. The dissent in Superior Court Trial Lawyers advocated application of the rule of reason
to the expressive boycott at issue in that case. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493
U.S. 411, 439 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent neither
recognized nor contended with the unique challenges that applying the rule of reason in a
conventional manner would raise.
293. Consistent with the conventional rule of reason, boycotters who have inflicted
competitive harm could, in theory, also attempt to demonstrate offsetting procompetitive
effects. This proposal does not eliminate the ability to make such arguments. The existence of a
speech interest, however, would not factor into that balancing test.
294. See supra Part I.B.3–4.
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a change in price or quantity of a good) is attributed to the
295
conspiracy, it is presumed to be a function of economic coercion.
But expressive boycotts, by design, seek to generate pressure
through public shaming or reputation degradation that need not
contribute to the direct coercive effects of a concerted refusal to buy.
“[B]oycotts need not substantially reduce sales to be successful. Firms
may comply with boycott demands in response to the moral pressure
and concern for the firm’s reputation, even absent any impact on
296
sales.” The negative publicity attendant to a boycott can “engender
a negative image that penetrates . . . [the minds of current and
297
prospective company staff].” As a result, companies may, for
example, encounter obstacles in “recruitment of high-quality
298
graduates” and in maintaining morale among existing employees.
“Employees don’t like working for a company that is being
299
attacked.”
Thus, the legitimacy of the conventional antitrust
presumption that market effects originate from economic coercion
becomes uncertain in the case of expressive boycotts.
Expressive boycotts raise the issue of whether established
boycott concessions were generated by persuasion or economic
coercion, a difficult assessment that is further complicated in the
context of expressive boycotts because some combination of those
two forces may also be present. Superior Court Trial Lawyers is the
only antitrust case that has directly addressed the cause of
concessions by a boycott target. Over the course of its numerous
proceedings, different jurists came to divergent conclusions regarding
the forces at play. The ALJ found that “there is no credible evidence
that the [target’s] eventual capitulation to the demands of
[boycotters] was made in response to public pressure, or, for that
matter, that [the] publicity campaign actually engendered any
300
significant measure of public pressure.” Justices Brennan and
Marshall found that “the success of the boycott could have been

295. These effects may be difficult to establish given that price and nonprice characteristics
of goods and services vary with changes in the economic environment (excluding the boycott),
with decisions to alter a firm’s strategy, and possibly even for reasons relating to pending or
anticipated litigation.
296. Klein et al., supra note 8, at 7.
297. Scott Clouder & Rob Harrison, The Effectiveness of Ethical Consumer Behaviour, in
THE ETHICAL CONSUMER 89, 96 (Rob Harrison et al. eds., 2005).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 416–17 (1990).
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attributable to the persuasiveness of its message rather than any
301
coercive economic force.” Given these diverse assessments, the
question becomes: To what extent can courts directly identify the
impetus for the target’s price change? Relatively little legal guidance
is available on this issue because neither the expressive aspect of such
boycotts nor the possibility of persuasion is currently recognized.
By replacing per se condemnation with a modified rule of reason,
this Article’s proposal allows for judicial recognition of a boycott’s
possible expressive purpose. Alleged anticompetitive effects are
treated differently depending on whether or not actual economic
effects are established. Claims of actual competitive harm will
frequently be relatively easy to allege if the expressive boycotts entail
302
concessions by the target firm. In such cases, the plaintiff would be
required to demonstrate that the boycotters’ withholding of
purchasing power was sufficiently coercive to generate the target
303
firm’s response. Confining the cognizable antitrust effect in this
manner requires distinguishing between the effects attributable to
economic coercion versus persuasion. This Article designates general
economic effects resulting from boycotts as “actual effects” and
reserves the term “actual anticompetitive effects” for those effects
resulting from economic coercion.
Market share that confers market power already functions as a
surrogate for anticompetitive effects when there are no directly
observable actual effects. This Article proposes that a similar type of
approach can also help determine, with certain limitations, whether
or not the source of ostensible actual anticompetitive effects is
304
persuasion rather than economic coercion. Under this proposal, the
following market power thresholds would guide the determination of
anticompetitive effects. A market share below 10 percent would
constitute a safety zone. Boycotts of this size would be deemed
presumptively insufficient to result in antitrust liability even when an
“actual effect,” though of unknown provenance, has been

301. Id. at 441 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
302. John & Klein, supra note 192, at 1197.
303. A weaker version of this proposal would permit expressive boycotters to proffer a
defense of insufficient market power. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 138, at 196
(“[P]rosecution in . . . speech-conduct case[s] could be adequately blunted by a special rule
allowing the defendants to prove their de minimis market power.”).
304. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 222, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(discussing the difficulty of discerning competitive effects).
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established. If there is an “actual market effect,” again of unknown
provenance, and the boycotters enjoy 20 percent or more of the
relevant antitrust market, however induced, then the market effect
would be presumed to result from direct coercion.
In the absence of an actual market effect, the rule of reason
analysis would proceed along conventional lines. Under those
circumstances, the plaintiff would need to establish a minimum
market share on the order of at least 35 to 50 percent to demonstrate
306
market power. The safety zone would be retained, however, and
particularly within this context it should be considered whether the 10
percent threshold should be increased in cases in which no actual
effect is alleged.
These thresholds could be implemented in a number of ways. By
case-by-case determinations, over time the courts would generate
piecemeal specific baselines. When making case-specific
determinations, individual judges can offer, in dicta, more general
baselines. Consider, for example, Judge Learned Hand’s famous, and
often cited, articulation in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
that a market share of “over ninety . . . is enough to constitute a
monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty . . . percent would be enough;
307
and certainly thirty-three per cent is not.” Another, far less likely
possibility would be the promulgation of an enforcement guideline by
the antitrust agencies within this area that retreats from the FTC’s
hard-fought win in Superior Court Trial Lawyers. Although legally
nonbinding, agency enforcement guidelines often exert a powerful
308
influence over the judiciary. Additionally, Congress could enact
legislation that either excludes expressive boycotts from the reach of
the Sherman Act or moderates the manner in which the Sherman Act
309
is applied. Though, for the same reasons that Congress opted to

305. Alternatively, one could establish different thresholds for situations that previously
would have been given per se treatment as opposed to rule of reason treatment.
306. See Andrew I. Gavil, Copperweld 2000: The Vanishing Gap Between Sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 103–04 (2000). The proposed 20 percent threshold
when a market effect is present, as opposed to the 35 to 50 percent in the absence of a market
effect, illustrates that the “inference of market power drawn from direct evidence is given far
greater weight than any circumstantial evidence based on market shares.” Id. at 99.
307. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
308. See generally Greene, supra note 83, at 781–809 (delineating and criticizing the impact
of merger guidelines upon the judiciary).
309. The 1970 Newspaper Preservation Act, which seeks to maintain “a newspaper press
editorially and reportorially independent and competitive in all parts of the United States,”
constitutes an example of congressional intervention regarding antitrust. 15 U.S.C. § 1801
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enact the extremely general Sherman Antitrust Act, it is also unlikely
310
to produce highly detailed legislation within this context.
The physician-led Abbott boycott illustrates the potential
significance of market share thresholds in antitrust analysis. By most
accounts, Abbott partially abandoned the 400 percent price increase
311
that prompted the boycott. Under this Article’s proposal, even
partial accommodation of boycott demands would not constitute
prima facie evidence of actual anticompetitive effect. An examination
of the marketplace into which Abbott sold its drugs would very likely
reveal that the couple hundred doctors who signed the petition stating
that they refused to prescribe Abbott drugs (when true substitutes
312
were available) enjoyed no real power in this market. As such, this
could well represent the type of boycott that would fall within this
Article’s proposed safety zone. One might also attempt to cast the
relevant market as that in which Abbott “purchases” physician
services for clinical trials or, more specifically, clinical trials of AIDS
drugs. In those circumstances, the boycotters’ market power (as
sellers) likely exceeds that under the prior market definition (as
buyers). It would remain necessary, though, to determine whether the
boycotters possessed sufficient market power to infer an
anticompetitive effect. Extremely involved inquiries of this type are
routinely undertaken in antitrust matters to avoid unnecessarily
condemning procompetitive conduct. First Amendment rights
313
warrant, at the least, comparable solicitude.

(1970). The act, which was “passed in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizen
Publishing Co. v. United States,” provides an exemption to the antitrust laws. Denise W.
DeFranco, Administrative Law: Chevron and Canons of Statutory Construction, 58 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 829, 832 (1990) (footnote omitted).
310. William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common
Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1982) (“The antitrust laws were
written with awareness of the diversity of business conduct and with the knowledge that the
detailed statutes which would prohibit socially undesirable conduct would lack the flexibility
needed to encourage (and at times even permit) desirable conduct. To provide this flexibility,
Congress adopted what is in essence enabling legislation that has permitted a common-law
refinement of antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the most general statutory
directions.”).
311. See Alcorn, supra note 253 (describing Abbott’s concessions, including selective price
reductions to levels prior to the controversial price hike).
312. See Francine Knowles, Doctors Boycott Abbott over Price Hike for AIDS Drug, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Feb. 11, 2004, at 75 (noting that boycotters “represent fewer than 2 percent of
physicians who treat AIDS patients”).
313. See Kindred, supra note 141, at 723 (advocating “the kind of broad-based factual
inquiry that the rule of reason affords” within this boycott context).
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Predictability in the law is always an important value. This is
even more true when “the inevitable caution that unpredictability
yields will induce self-censorship (‘chilling’) of that which may very
314
well be important.” Although the current legal regime, as a practical
matter, arguably offers greater First Amendment predictability
regarding expressive boycotts than this Article’s proposal, that is only
because “predictability” in this context also encompasses the
certainty of little or no protection. The recommendations in this
Article provide significant guidance regarding First Amendment
protections of expressive boycotts and, given their heavy reliance
upon antitrust policy and precedent, provide vital consistency from a
competition perspective.
B. Nonrecommendations
The approach advocated by this Article, consistent with the
Superior Court Trial Lawyers dissent, takes the form of an
unconventional accommodation. Rather than recommend either
wide-ranging or zero immunity, this Article recommends antitrust
immunity for a range of boycotts when two conditions are met: the
presence of more than a bona fide speech interest and the absence of
315
market power.
If those two conditions do not hold, then
conventional antitrust analysis, including possible per se
condemnation, applies. This final Section considers, and rejects,
modifying the two prongs of the proposed standard in a manner that
would further expand First Amendment protection.
Should speech protection be further enhanced by eliminating the
316
market power exception to immunity? Consider an immunization
314. Schauer, supra note 41, at 299.
315. For all of their differences, the majority and dissent in Superior Court Trial Lawyers
agreed that the expressive boycott was not entitled to immunity under the First Amendment.
The dissent clearly deemed the boycott to be a “political communication.” Given the boycott’s
potential for economic coercion, however, the dissent refused to render the boycott “immune
from scrutiny.” FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 448 (1990) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In so doing, the dissent transcended the majority’s
unsuccessful efforts to deny the expressive component of the boycott. By relying on O’Brien,
the dissent demonstrated a willingness to “balance First Amendment interests implicated by the
facts of [the] case.” Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight from First
Amendment Doctrine: Justice Breyer’s New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 817, 819
n.12 (1998) (emphasis added).
316. Noerr is generally referred to interchangeably as a defense or as an immunity. See
Russell Wofford, Considering the “Pattern Litigation” Exception to the Noerr-Pennington
Antitrust Defense, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 95, 98 n.10 (2003). This Part has proposed a First
Amendment–based defense/immunity which operates to modify the applicable antitrust
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approach that requires only a minimal showing of a speech interest.
Given such a powerful defense, potential boycotters lacking any
underlying speech interest might be induced to undertake a public
boycott incorporating a speech component. If such “feigned” speech
were readily identified and excluded from First Amendment
317
protection, this prospect would not be troubling. It is more likely,
however, that distinguishing sham from bona fide speech interests will
prove exceedingly difficult. Within the Noerr context where, for
example, similar determinations regarding litigation must be made,
the courts have adopted an extremely low threshold, comparable to
Rule 11 analysis under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for what
318
constitutes bona fide litigation. An alternative mechanism for
making this assessment would inquire into the litigant’s motivations,
but the Supreme Court has affirmatively rejected the relevance of
319
motivation unless the action is objectively baseless.
Despite the Court’s reluctance to engage in the analysis of
motivation in the related Noerr context, analysis of motivation has
been used elsewhere in antitrust law—for example, through the use of
a “but for” analysis to assess the existence of a conspiracy. Here, a
“but for” approach could possibly be used to help determine whether
boycott speech is feigned or real. As this Article has argued, the level
of engagement in public discourse is a possible indicator that the
boycott was expressive. In theory, then, to determine whether the
boycott speech was feigned, one could examine whether such public
discourse would have been undertaken absent the prospect of
immunity. Given the Superior Court Trial Lawyers ruling, however,
this “but for” immunity argument sweeps far too broadly. Presently,
many potential boycotters with an economic interest who fear
antitrust actions would be reluctant to undertake boycotts and risk
antitrust condemnation. In practice, therefore, all such boycotters,
even those with bona fide speech interests, would be more likely to
engage in such expressive conduct if antitrust immunity were
analysis. This Section considers alternative standards that are so protective of speech that they
are referred to loosely in terms of immunity for emphasis.
317. The Supreme Court has long held that “First Amendment rights may not be used as
the means or the pretext for achieving ‘substantive evils’ which the legislature has the power to
control.” California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972) (citation
omitted).
318. See, e.g., Lisa Wood, In Praise of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, ANTITRUST, Fall
2003, at 72, 73 (noting the similarity between Noerr’s exception for sham litigation and Rule 11).
319. Prof’l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49, 59–60 (1993) (stating
that motivation is irrelevant if the litigation is objectively reasonable).
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available. If all, or nearly all, boycotts involved speech induced on
some level by the prospect of antitrust immunity, then a “but for”
approach would constitute a poor screen.
A somewhat less aggressive alternative to full immunization
when a boycott involves a bona fide speech interest would be to grant
immunity (without considering market power) when a boycott’s
speech interest is deemed “significant,” however defined. Relative to
the bona fide speech standard advocated, which merely requires more
than a de minimis interest, a more aggressive partitioning of
expressive boycotts seems much more difficult to implement, more
prone to chilling speech, and open to criticism as arbitrary absent
some clear principle justifying a further subcategorization of which
speech warrants protection. While it is possible that such a principle
might be developed and applied to this context, the history of
attempts to make principled distinctions of this type in the First
Amendment area underscores the difficulty of such an enterprise.
Under this Article’s proposal, which advocates application of a
modified rule of reason, the problem of feigned expressive boycotts
that seems particularly troubling under full immunization is
significantly mitigated. By focusing on the economic consequences of
market conduct, rule of reason analysis protects the speech interests
of boycotters who lack market power and cause no antitrust harm.
The risk of feigning speech to limit antitrust liability is potentially
very high to conspirators because exposing the existence of a
conspiracy increases the probability of an antitrust action. For those
whose underlying speech interest is most tenuous, this increased
probability is also relatively more risky as, in the case of price fixing, a
prosecuted conspiracy still risks per se treatment. Furthermore,
320. It is possible to develop a different baseline than current law for the “but for”
immunity comparison. One natural candidate for such a baseline is that in which identified
group boycotts are vulnerable to antitrust sanction only if they adversely affect competition.
Without immunity being available, a group boycott with sufficient market power to force target
concessions would not likely engage in (unneeded) public discourse, which would greatly
increase the risk associated with discovery and prosecution. With immunity, however, those
boycotters would likely engage in public discourse and shield their boycott. On the other hand,
a boycott that lacks market power but includes a bona fide speech interest would engage in
public discourse, even without immunity, since the boycott would not be vulnerable to an
antitrust sanction given this alternative baseline for the “but for” assessment. Immunity would
also be attractive to this class of boycotters (no market power), but the speech activities would
have been undertaken without the possibility of immunity. This approach effectively recreates a
market power–based categorization similar to this Article’s proposal, but with additional
complications associated with assessing motivation and dealing with conspirators that have
heterogeneous preferences.
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disingenuous boycotters risk a public backlash should their subterfuge
be exposed. In sum, even when antitrust leniency immunizes feigned
boycotts, the costs of such errors are cabined under this proposal.
Only boycotters without market power will avoid liability, but they
are precisely the group that does not threaten antitrust harm.
***
Expressive boycotts by politically motivated and economically
interested parties constitute the type of undertaking that can be
meaningfully assessed under both the First Amendment and the
Sherman Act so long as neither regime resorts to overly simplistic
analysis. The First Amendment (with the introduction of
intermediate scrutiny and O’Brien balancing) and the Sherman Act
(with an increasing reliance upon the rule of reason) are well
equipped to provide the more nuanced analysis required. As Superior
Court Trial Lawyers illustrated with regard to the First Amendment,
once a court unnecessarily restricts itself to an all-or-nothing type of
analysis, “the difficulties of ‘all’ [immunizing speech] may lead courts
321
to choose ‘nothing.’” As this Article has demonstrated, however,
the courts need not restrict themselves in that manner. A vital form of
intermediate First Amendment protection is available through
O’Brien and can be meaningfully accommodated through antitrust
law’s adoption of a modified rule of reason. Stated alternatively,
antitrust law need not adopt an all-or-nothing perspective regarding
its own ability to accommodate noneconomic factors such as speech.
Through recommendations as well as nonrecommendations, this
Article demonstrates how the law could strike a superior balance
between First Amendment and competition values despite their
inherent incommensurability.
CONCLUSION
Expressive boycotts combine speech with economic coercion or,
more specifically, the potential for such coercion, and present a
difficult challenge to current antitrust and First Amendment law. The
Supreme Court’s response in Superior Court Trial Lawyers, the
controlling precedent on this issue, effectively rejects the argument

321. Schauer, supra note 41, at 286. Schauer argues that in the absence of some form of
intermediate First Amendment protection both commercial speech and defamation were
deemed “outside first amendment protection.” Id.
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that economically self-interested boycotters have speech interests
worthy of First Amendment protection. Ironically, it is oftentimes
precisely these parties who are most knowledgeable about and
committed to the social and community issues at stake. The unique
features of a boycott in engendering social discourse coupled with the
frequent absence of any underlying market power renders antitrust
condemnation, or even discouragement, of these efforts dubious from
an economic perspective as well as unconstitutional. After closely
examining the precursors to Superior Court Trial Lawyers to
underscore the longstanding biases of both First Amendment and
antitrust law made manifest in that ruling, this Article concludes that
ensuring adequate protection of expressive boycotts requires reforms
in both areas of law.
Whatever one’s ultimate assessment regarding the merits of the
intellectual property–related boycotts discussed, they were expressive
undertakings and not merely conventional concerted refusals to deal.
This Article recommends more lenient antitrust treatment of boycotts
involving a speech interest. Under this proposal, all expressive
boycotts would receive a modified rule of reason treatment, and
cognizable market effects would be limited to those directly resulting
from the boycotters’ economic power. Additionally, market power
thresholds, particularly a safety zone, would assist the courts in
accommodating these incommensurate values. This balanced
approach would be more difficult to implement than either per se
condemnation or complete immunity, but it would end antitrust law’s
unwarranted censorship of expressive boycotts.

